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CHAPTER I 
PURPOSE AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Purpose 
An interest in the components of interpersonal competence, 
prerequisites1 for effective social interaction, dates back at 
least to the work of Thorndike (1920), Piaget (1926), and 
Mead (1934); however, studies with this focus have burgeoned 
to such an extent in the last decade that several review 
articles have been written in an attempt to define and syn-
thesize this complicated, amorphous field: see, for example, 
books and reviews by Christie and Geis (1970), Deutsch and 
Madle (1975), Hoffman (1977), Shantz (1975), and Walker and. 
Foley (1974). Although much of this work has focused on social 
cognition, including role taking and empathy, other concepts, 
such as Machiavellianism, have received attention. Indeed, 
high role-taking or empathetic ability and a Machiavellian 
orientation to interpersonal relations have been considered 
two of the components of interpersonal competence by Anderson 
and Mess1ck (1974), 01 Malley (1977), and Smith (1968). 
In an article coinciding with the upsurge of interest 
in interpersonal competence, Weinstein (1969) suggested relation-
1With the exception of partner, the independent vari-
ables in the present study are subject variables. There-
fore, the relationships are correlational, not causal. 
At certain points in the study, it has been useful to use 
terminology which might seem to imply causality. That is not the 
intention. 
1 
ships between role taking or empathy and Machiavellianism, 
on the one hand, and the interaction process, on the other. 
Weinstein wrote, "I!i.!.~rpersonal competence boils dovm to 
the ability to manipulate other's responses. As such 
the concept is value free Competence is relative to 
the actor's purpose" {p. 755). 
Since Weinstein's article, interest in the relation-
ship between interpersonal competence and the interaction 
process has been sporadic. Shantz (1975) has written, 
11 In fact, the relationship between social cognition and· 
interpersonal behavior may be one of the largest unexplored 
areas in developmental psychology today" (p. 303). 
The present study was designed to explore the re-· 
lationships among the constructs of Machiavellianism, 
role taking and empathy; and.to investigate those 
constructs as predictors of interpersonal behavior. The 
interpersonal behaviors studied were tendencies to behave 
in an altruistic or aggressive, a cooperative or competitive 
manner. Altruistic and cooperative behavior were consider-
ed prosocial, aggressive and competitive behavior, anti-
social or asocial. These behaviors were studied using the 
Prisoner's Dilemma game modified by introducing the option 
of making altruistic or aggressive moves. Cooperative and 
competitive alternatives are, of course, part of the tradi-
tional Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The preprogrammed moves 
2 
of the partner were varied so that some subjects played 
against an altruistic partner, some against an aggressive 
partner, and some against a neutral partner. In one condition, 
there was no option introduced. The characteristics of the 
partner were varied because the behavior of individuals 
varies in interpersonal situations partly as a function of 
interpersonal cues. 
Review of the Literature 
Social cognition and perspective taking. Social cognitt6n-
has become the umbrella term for a host of interconnected and 
overlapping concepts in social and developmental psychology 
(e.g., person perception, empathy, social intelligence, 
role taking, and perspective taking). It refers to how people 
"conceptualize other people and how they come to understand 
the thoughts, emotion~, intentions, and viewpoints of others" 
(Shantz, 1975, p. 258). 
As pointed out earlier, numerous reviews have been 
written in an attempt to synthesize findings in this area. 
· In one of those reviews, Shantz (1975) classified studies of 
social cognition, for heuristic purposes (neither factor-
analytic nor other construct-validation studies have consistent-
ly supported any of the proposed typologies of social-cognitive 
abilities), into five sets according to which of five questions 
each is designed to answer: What is the other seeing? What 
is the other feeling? What is the other thinking? What is 
the other intending? What is the other like? 
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A major distinction has been drawn between the first 
four questions and related studies and the fifth. Only the 
first four sets of studies are relevant here. They have in 
common a concern with inferring another's immediate response 
to the world as it impinges on him, and have been called studies 
of perspective taking. (The fifth set of studies concerns 
the subject's ability to judge relatively enduring properties 
of the other and has been called studies of person perception.) 
Hoffman (1975) has used the term spatial role taking to 
refer to the studies answering the question about what the other 
is seeing and cognitive role taking for the studies answer-
ing the question about what the other is thinking. Hoffman 
has used two terms, affective role taking and empathy, to desig-
nate studies concerning what the other is feeling: affective 
role taking concerns the ability to understand the other's 
feelings, empathy concerns the ability to feel sympathetically, 
as well as understand, the other's feelings. 
In the present study, the term empathy is used to desig-
_nate the ability to understand the other's feelings. Role 
taking is used to designate the ability to understand what the 
other is thinking. Perspective taking will be used as the 
generic term to refer to the ability to adopt the other's 
point of view, whether perceptually, cognitively, or affectively. 
The study of role taking, as used in the present study, 
began in 1959 when Feffer's classic article appeared describing 
the Role Taking Task, a storytelling task designed to extend 
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the study of Piaget's notion of balanced decentering from 
the nonsocial to the social world. (The Role Taking Task 
was used in the present study as a measure of role taking.) 
In this test, the subject tells a story in response to a 
TAT-like picture and then retells the same story taking 
the points of view of each story character in turn. Schnall 
and Feffer (Note l) have summarized the rationale underlying 
the Role Taking Task: 
Piaget has suggested that lack of constancy is due to 
the inordinate influence of one part of the situation 
upon the estimate of the whole. That is to say, focus-
ing only upon the increased height leads to an over-
estimate of quantity, while focusing upon the decreased 
circumference leads to an underestimate. Piaget, accord-
ingly, attributes the younger child's fluctuations and 
extremes to the act of sequentially focusing upon one 
aspect of the situation at a time. In contrast, the 
older child achieves constancy of quantity by virtue of 
a dominance of thought, whereby changes in both height 
and circumference are simultaneously considered in 
relation to each other such that the distortion engen-
dered by one centering or perspective is balanced by the 
other. Greater stability and veridicality of functioning 
is thus afforded by the modulating influence of different, 
simultaneously experienced, centerings of perspectives. 
The concept of decentering as proposed by Piaget has 
stemmed primarily from his investigations of the child's 
cognitive structuring of the physical, inanimate world. 
The concept can be extended, however, to the cognitive 
structuring of interpersonal content, an extension which 
is embodied in the structure and scoring criteria of 
the RTT. 
The concept of decentering which underlies the RTT 
suggests that an actor, as an item of social content, 
may be described from more than one point of view. The 
different roles represent different points of view, 
and the actor is the object upon which refocusing 
takes place from these points of view. Thus, the RTT 
is evaluated in terms of the degree to which the subject 
is able to shift from his initial orientation in 
refocusing upon his actors from different roles, while 
5 
at the same time maintaning continuity between his 
various versions of his initial story. (pp. 9-10) 
Several techniques, besides the Role Taking Task, have 
been used to investigate role taking. One popular method is a 
communication task in which the subject's task is to describe 
nonsense figures so that a subject who has the figures before 
him can pick out the one that the subject is describing 
(Glucksberg & Krauss, 1967). Another technique (DeVries, 
1970) involves the subject guessing the strategy another is using 
in hiding a penny. Still others (Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, 
& Jarvis, 1968) have had children explain games learned 
nonverbally to sighted and blindfolded subjects or had subjects 
tell stories in response to a seven-card cartoon sequence and 
then retell it with some of the cards missing. Generally, 
correlations among measures of role taking have been low 
or moderate, though this has varied (see Shantz, 1975). 
Correlations between the Role Taking Task and measures 
of intelligence have been reported in several studies. 
Feffer and Gourevitch (1960) found that children's scores 
on the Role Taking Task show a low positive correlation-with 
verbal intelligence. Sullivan and Hunt (1967) found a moderate 
correlation between intelligence and the Role Taking Task among 
11-year-old children but not among 7-and 9-year-old children. 
Rubin (1974), however, reported moderate to high correlations 
with intelligence. Kurdek (Note 2) has reviewed studies which 
correlate the Role Taking Task and measures of intelligence. 
6 
He has reported enormous variability in the correlations. 
Only half of the correlations reached statistical significance, 
and the significant correlations ranged from low to high. 
A number of studies have investigated the relationship 
between role taking and social behavior. Feffer and Suchotliff 
(1966) found positive correlations between the Role Taking Task 
and observer ratings of interpersonal effectiveness. Chaplin 
and Keller (1974-) found the same with peer ratings of inter-
personal effectiveness. Rubin and Schneider (1973) found 
positive correlations between communicative role taking and 
both donating and helping behavior (!:. = .29 and .64, respective-
ly) among 7-year-olds. Staub (1971) trained kindergarten 
children in role playing of helping and being helped; those 
who received training were more likely to help a child in 
distress than those who did not. Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, 
and Brady-Smith (1977) reported positive correlations between 
batteries of role-taking tasks and helping and sharing behavior. 
On the other hand, Ianottt' (Note 3} found no relationship -
between role taking and sharing behavior. Rushton and Wiener 
(1974) found no relationship between various measures of role 
taking and altruism. 
There is some evidence of a negative relationship be-
tween role taking and asocial behavior. Chandler (1973} found 
that delinquent boys had poorer role-taking skills than 
comparable groups of nondelinquent boys. He also found that 
delinquent boys who received training in role-taking skills 
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had fewer arrests in subsequent months than those who did not. 
In sum, Feffer's Role Taking Task is the first of several 
role-taking tasks devised to explore the development of balanced 
decentering in the human world. These tasks tend to correlate 
moderately among themselves and with measures of verbal intel-
1 ig~nce. Though the results are mixed, measures of role taking 
tend to correlate positively with prosocial behavior and 
negatively with antisocial behavior. 
Deutsch and Madle (1975) have traced the history of the 
concept of empathy to psychologists writing in the first quarter of 
this century when empathy was thought of as postural imitation. 
As time passed, researchers accepted the view that empathy 
was based on self-other differentiation and that empathy 
involved understanding the other's affective state, either 
alone or in relation to situational cues. (Some studies have 
required the subject to judge the other's emotion based on 
cues exclusively from the other. Some have included information 
about the situation.) At this time (cf. Shantz, Note 4), 
empathy sometimes refers to a sympathetic emotional response 
on the part of the subject and sometimes refers to the subject's 
understanding of another's emotions. 
As with role taking, in recent years a number of measures 
of empathy have been developed. Of particular interest as 
prototypes for the present study are the works of Flapan 
(1968) and Rothenberg (1970). To study children's understanding 
of social interaction, including empathy, Flapan (1968) showed 
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children brief episodes from movies and asked them to retell 
these episodes. The retellings were scored for a variety of 
responses, including feelings. Rothenberg (1970) played audio-
recordings of brief interchanges between adults, and the children 
were asked how the adults were feeling at various points. 
Empathy was measured in the present study by the Empathy 
Questionnaire (see Feczko, Note 5). Episodes from popular 
television programs were videotaped and shown to the subjects. 
The videotape was stopped at critical moments, and the subjects 
were asked how one of the protagonists ~as feeli~g. The 
subjects were provided with four alternative responses to 
choose from. 
Regarding the relationship between empathy and intelligence, 
Rothenberg (1970) reported correlations of .24 between empathy 
and verbal intelligence and .28 between empathy and nonverbal 
intelligence. Moir (1974) reported a moderate correlation 
between empathy and intelligence (r_ ~ .51). These findings 
suggest that empathy, like role taking, shows a low positive 
correlation with intelligence. Feczko (Note 6) reported a 
low positive correlation (r_ = .39) between an earlier version 
of the Empathy Questionnaire and intelligence. Feczko (Note 5) 
reported a low positive correlation (r = .27) between the Empathy 
Questionnaire, as used in the present study, and intelligence. 
Rothenberg (1970) found that empathy scores correlated 
positively with peer ratings of generosity, friend.liness, 
and leadership. Johnson (1975) found a positive correlation 
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between empathy and cooperativeness. Fry (1976) found a 
positive correlation between empathy and altruism and a negative 
correlation with self-gratification. On the other hand, 
Levine and Hoffman (1975) did not find a correlation between 
empathy and cooperativeness, among 4-year-olds, though age 
may be a factor here. Evidence regarding the relationship 
between empathy and anti-social behavior is mixed. Feshbach 
and Feshbach (1969) found positive correlations between 
empathy and aggression in 4- and 5-yeur-old boys, negative 
correlations in 6- and 7-year-_old boys, and no correlation 
among girls. Green (1977), using film clips depicting emotions, 
asked kindergarten children to identify the emotion and 
state the cause. Green found a significant positive correlation 
between causal attribution and disposition to help others for 
girls but not for boys. 
The evidence regarding the relationship between measures 
of role taking and empathy is by no means consistent. Kurdek 
and Rodgon (1975) studied correlations among various measures 
or perspective taking, including measures of empathy and role 
taking, in children from kindergarten through grade 6. Empathy 
and role taking tended to be uncorrelated; however, the two 
correlated positive1y (r_ = .51) in fourth-grade females, but 
they correlated negatively for third-grade males (r = -.73) 
and fifth-grade females (r_ = -.55). Moir (1974) found a 
.49 correlation between one measure of role taking and empathy 
but no significant relationship between another measure of 
10 
role taking and empathy. 
In sum, a picture emerges from the study of empathy 
similar to the one which emerged with role taking. Measures 
of empathy correlate moderately with intelligence and moderately 
with measures of role taking. Some studies show a positive 
relation to prosocial behaviors, some show no relation, and no 
consistent picture emerges about a relation between empathy 
and antisocial behavior. 
In the present study, then, role taking was measured 
using the Role Taking Task, empathy using the Empathy Question-
naire. It is appropriate to consider their characteristics 
as measures in relation to the constructs they measure, role 
taking and empathy. Both the Role Taking Task and the Empathy 
Questionnaire require the subject to assess another's immediate 
response to the environment or definition of the situation. In 
the first, the other's understanding or cognition of the sigua-
tion is the focus, in the second the other's feelings or affect 
towards the situation. Both require the subject to assess the 
situation as it impinges on the other, but the Empathy Questionnaire, 
as many of the empathy measures, requires the subject to assess 
verbal and nonverbal cues from the other, as well as situational 
cues, to determine what the other is feeling. The Role Taking 
Task requires the subject to make up stories about characters 
in situations in response to simulus cards. The subject must 
retell the facts of the story consistently while adjusting 
to the shift in perspective from one character's point of view 
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to another's. The Role Taking Task thus depends on memory 
to a greater extent than the Empathy Questionnaire. Since an 
accurate understanding of emotions, as well as thoughts and 
intentions, contributes to the score of the Role Taking Task 
under certain circumstances, the measures are not as distinct 
conceptually as one might wish. The Empathy Questionnaire 
measures the subject's ability quickly to assess another's 
feeling response to an immediate situation, while the Role 
Taking Task measures the subject's ability to shift from one 
characterJs point of view to another's, while holding the facts 
of the story in his memory. 
Measures of perspective taking have been criticized, 
including Borke's early works (cf. reviews by Chandler and 
Greenspan, 1972, and Shantz, Note 4), because what appears 
to be perspective taking may be projection. Subjects are 
notably more successful at taking the perspective of others of 
like age, sex, and race. Both measures used in the present 
study involve precautions against projection. The Empathy 
Questionnaire requires the subject to understand the emotions 
of adults in most instances, while the Role Taking Task allows 
the child, within limits, to make up characters and situations 
he feels comfortable with. 
Machiavellianism. According to Christie (l970d), discussions 
centering on Machiavellianism as a psychological construct 
began informally during the years 1954-1955. Several psycholo-
gists speculated that there were four primary characteristics 
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of the operator or manipulator: (a) lack of affect in inter-
personal relationships, (b) lack of concern with conventional 
morality, (c) lack of gross psychopathology, and (d) low 
ideological commitment. Shortly thereafter, Christie (1970b) 
constructed a scale to assess Machiavellianism with Mach-
iavelli's The Prince and The Discourses being the source for 
- -
statements, which distinguish responses of high and low Machs. 
Ultimately, two versions of the Mach scales were devised: 
Mach IV, a Likert-type scale, and Mach V, a forced-choice 
scale designed to control for social desirability. By the 
mid '60s, articles had begun to appear in the literature 
using the Mach scales, and in 1970 Christie and Geis' Studies 
j_!! Machiavellianism appeared summarizing previous work and 
formulating the notions of high and low Mach. Since then, 
scattered articles have appeared in the literature. 
Weinstein was among the early researchers (see, for 
example, Weinstein, Beckhouse, Blumstein, & Stein, 1968), and 
his article on social competence, antedating Studies in 
Machiavellianism, was less than comprehensive in its treatment 
of Machiavellianism. According to l~einstein (1969), !h<:! high 
Mach uses 11 any line of action if it appears to promote profitable 
outcomes for him 11 (p. 770). And ~..Jeinstein wrote, "The emperical 
evidence seems to suggest that persons h1£!1.5~n Machiavellianism 
are more interpersonally competent ..• A touch of psychopathy, 
then, may be helpful if success in controlling others is the 
object 11 (p. 770). The low Mach, in contract, is characterized 
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by rigidity and rule-boundedness. Rigid_ individuals have been 
taught that there is safety in conforming to role behavior. 
They (ll ~-~ tend to become ego-i nvo 1 ved to their own detriment 
while, for the high Mach, "No line of action has cost value 
due to loss of self-esteem" (p. 770). In other words, in his 
early formulation, Weinstein has related Machiavellianism 
at a theoretical level to ego structure and to role performance. 
Perhaps with an eye to understanding Machiavellianism in 
relation to ongoing social interaction, Geis and Christie 
(1970) have distinguished high and.low Machs accofdfng to what 
might be called their interpersonal stance. They have sum-
mari zed the traits of the high Machs as p'the coo 1 syndrome, 11 
~•=« .l,.,.-,-•o ·"""=-""'"' '~"~ __ , ~·¥ 
which involves (a) resistance to social influence, (b) orienta-
....__....,._~,.._,..,~ >-· ' "" 
tion to cognitions, and (3) initiating structure and controlling 
it. Low Machs, in contrast, were characterized as "the soft 
touch, 11 involving (a) susceptibility to social influence, 
(b) oriented to persons, and (c) accepting and following of 
structure. Int_~rpersonally~ high Machs spend their time 
manipulating, while low Machs encounter. "Encountering is a 
process by which we change through direct contact with one 
another. Encountering happens when we open up to one another" 
(Geis & Christie, 1970, p. 260). In contrast to Weinstein 
(1969) who said that high Machs are more competent inter-
personally than low Machs, Geis and Christie (1970) indicated 
that high and low Machs operate differently in an interpersonal 
context, the implication being each excels interpersonally, 
..._,,.,. <•'"···~· -· 
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but in dHferent ways. Indeed, high Machs do not outmani pul ate 
low Machs in all situation. High Machs excel in situations where 
there is face-to-face interaction, l~titude for improvisation, 
and the development of task-irrelevant affect. 
The relationship between Machiavellianism and a number of 
other personality measures has been studied, and some of the 
results are relevant to the present study. Christie (1970a) 
has summarized these findings. Correlations between intelligence 
and Machiavellianism have been consistently low and nonsignificant, 
suggesting strongly that Machiavellianism and intelligence are, 
in fact, unrelated. This is compatible with Weinstein's (1969) 
distinction between empathy and Machiavellianism in which he 
views them as separate, and by implication uncorrelated, and 
views intelligence as one aspect of empathy or role taking. 
Not surprisingly, Machiavellians take a dim view of human 
nature. Christie (1970c) reported correlations between 
Machiavellianism and Wrightsman's philosophies of human nature 
(Wrightsman, 1964). There was a correlation of -.67 with the 
view that others are trustworthy, -.54 with the view that others 
are altruistic, -.47 with the view that others are independent, 
and -.38 with the view that others have pronounced strength 
of will. A number of findings have suggested that high Machs 
tend to be more hostile and suspicious than low Machs; however, 
there was no correlation between Machiavellianism and the 
MMPI scales, including psychopathy. Thus, it seems that, 
although high Machs may tend to be hostile and suspicious, 
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it may be inappropriate to label them sociopathic. 
Recently, Delia and O'Keefe (1976) studied the relation-
ship between Machiavellianism and complexity of interpersonal 
constructs. Complexity was measured by the number of constructs 
used in written descriptions of peers, one liked and one 
disliked. The authors found correlations of -.54 and -.49, 
respectively. These results are compatible with the view 
that low Machs are mor~ oriented to people than high Machs. 
Numerous studies have compared the performance of high 
and low Machs in experimental situations. In a study, which 
could be classified as an empathy study or a study of person 
perception, Geis and Levy (1970) required subjects to choose 
from the members of a group which had been playing a structured 
coalition game, the person they felt they could "size up" 
mose accurately. The subjects then filled out the Mach IV 
scale as they believed the other person would. It was found 
that high Machs' judgments tended to be closer to the actual 
group mean than low Machs 1 s judgments, but low Machs were mere 
accurate in judging others• positions relative to themselves. 
High Machs overestimated the scores of low Machs and under-
estimated the scores of high Machs, thereby achieving a relatively 
accurate estimate of the mean but not of the separate groups. 
Low Machs underestimated the scores of both, slightly in the 
case of low Machs and greatly in the case of high Machs, thereby 
judging the position of others accurately relative to themselves 
but misjudging the group mean. The implication of this study 
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is that high Machs render accurate judgments about people in 
general, but are not accurate in their estimation of the posi-
tion of others relative to themselves, the reverse being true 
of 1 ow Machs. 
Christie and Geis (1970) reviewed an unpublished study by 
Geis and Leventhal in which subjects defended positions, as in 
a formal debate. Sometimes the subjects defended positions 
they privately endorsed, sometimes positions they did not 
endorse privately. The same subjects also acted as judges 
whose task it was to judge whether the debaters were defending 
positions they privately endorsed or did not endorse. Low 
Machs were better than high Machs at judging whether subjects 
were telling the truth or lying. 
both low and high Mach subjects. 
They were better judges of 
High Machs were not better 
··-·"··~- --.-·~~·'-· ............ , ___ ,.. 
deceivers than low Machs; however, they were better truth 
tellers: judges believed they were telling the truth when they 
were telling the truth more often than they believed low Machs. 
These results support the notion that lpw Ma~hs are better 
judges of people than high Machs. 
High Machs seem to be better able to persuade others to 
believe them or to do things against their will than low Machs. 
In one experiment (Geis, Christie, & Nelson, 1970) in which 
subjects were given the role of experimenter in a psychological 
experiment, high Machs were more effective and innovative 
deceivers. Braginsky (1970) assigned children to persuade 
other children to eat crackers which had been soaked in a 
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solution of quinine. High-Mach children were more successful 
than low-Mach children in gaining compliance. 
The behavior of high and low Machs has been compared using 
a variety of competitive games. The general finding has been 
that high Machs win more than low Machs on all but the Prisoner's 
Dilemma game. This has contributed to the theory that high· 
Machs excel under conditions of face-to-face interaction with 
latitude for improvisation and arousal of irrelevant affect. 
At lease half a dozen studies involving Machiavellianism 
have used the Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm. Wrightsman (1966) 
studied differences in Mach scores as a function of trusting 
or distrusting in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Subjects were 
classified trusting if their first move was cooperative and if 
they gave as their reason that they expected the other to 
reciprocate. Subjects were classified as mistrustful if their 
first move was competitive and said they expected their partner 
to reciprocate. High and low Machs did not differ significantly 
in their trustfulness as measured in this situation. 
Christie, Gergen, and Marlowe (1970) reported a study in 
which cooperativeness of partner and type of reward were 
varied. It made no difference in the subjects' play whether the 
partner played 20%, 50%, or 80% cooperatively, nor did it make 
any difference whether the subject was high Mach or low Mach. 
The only significant finding was that -~~gh Ma_c:_~s became 
more competitive over time. To vary type of incentive, the 
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authors started off with an initial 10 trials for points 
and then shifted to dollars or pennies. Payment was made 
after each trial. High Machs became more cooperative in the 
dollar condition and won less than low Machs. Anbther finding 
was that high Machs were more retaliatory, responding heavily 
with competitive moves after the partner made a competitive 
move. These results suggest that high Machs may attempt a pro-
social strategy, but if this fails, they tend to retaliate. 
High Machs seem to be parti cul ar·ly responsive to monetary 
.rewards. 
Christie et al. (1970) also reviewed an unpublished 
study by Wahlin in which he studied responses to a vindictive 
other. When the subject played competitively the programmed 
other p·layed a series of competitive moves. Low Machs did 
not retaliate and won a significant number of points in 
contrast to high Machs who retaliated and lost a significant 
number of points. This is further evidence that high Machs are 
retaliatory. 
Lake's unpublished study was summarized by Wrightsman, 
O'Conner, and Baker (1972): 
Lake compared subjects who scored high on Machiavel-
lianism with those scoring low when both groups were 
given information as to whether the other player was 
cooperative or competitive. Forming an impression that 
the other was cooperative led low and high Machs to 
increase their own cooperativeness, but much more so 
for lows than for highs. Anticipating a competitive 
other led low Machs to be defensive and high Machs to 
be aggressive. {p. 242) 
Uejio and Wrightsman (1972) reported negative correlations 
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between Machiavellianism and cooperativeness in a game where 
the partner played 76% cooperatively. Finally, Swan (1973) found 
that high Machs were more cooperative than low Machs against a 
cooperative other and just as cooperative against a competitive 
other. 
In sum, the results on cooperativeness and competitiveness 
of high and low Machs in the Prisoner's Dilemma game are not 
consistent; however, it does appear that high Machs are more 
retaliatory than low Machs. It is not clear how the payoff 
matrix influences the behavior of high and low Machs. Perhaps 
different consequences in different payoff matrices might explain 
differences in cooperativeness and competitiveness. In fact, 
Christie et al. (1970) have suggested that it would be useful 
to vary the payoff matrix to see whether high Machs adapt 
their play to differences in payoff matrices more rationally 
than low Machs. 
Behavior of high and low Machs has been compared on several 
other types of experimental games. Durkin (1970), for example, 
described a game in which pairs of subjects held handles of 
a large plexiglass spiral. The whole apparatus resembled a 
large spiral wedding cake with handles sticking out of the sides 
at the bottom. The objective was to move a ball up to the top 
by tilting the spiral. High Machs were not more effective than 
low Machs; however, the scores of high-Mach pairs were pre-
dictable from individual scores. Scores of low-Mach pairs 
depended more on the combination of individuals. Durkin 
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concluded that this supports the idea that low Machs become more 
personally involved than high Machs in situations of face-to-face 
interaction. It v1as a simple task with little opportunity for 
improvisation or manipulation. 
In most experimental games, especially negotiation or 
coalition games, high Machs have a definite advantage. In the 
11 legislature game" (Geis, Weinheimer, & Berger, 1970), subjects 
were to persuade fellow "congressmen" to vote certain ways on 
certain issues. High and Low Machs did not differ in their 
persuasiveness on noncontroversial issues; however, high Machs 
were much more effective than low Machs when dealing with 
controversial ones. Presumably low Machs were distracted by 
and became involved in the controversial issues while high 
Machs did not. Geis (1970) found that high Machs were much 
more effective than low Machs in forming coalitions to their 
own advantage in a standard coalition game where subjects play 
parchesi with the option of forming coalitions to their mutual 
advantage. 
In sum, regarding Machiavellianism, it appears that (a) 
Machiavellianism is uncorrelated with intelligence; (b) high 
Machiavellians have a negative or pessimistic view of people; 
(c) Machiavellianism is positively correlated with a hostile 
attitude towards people in general and a tendency towards 
retaliation, though this should not be termed psychopathy; 
(d) low Machs are better at understanding individuals and 
individual differences, though high Machs may have a more 
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accurate general unders tan ding of people; ( e) _lgw Machs become 
more involved with others than high Machs, and their task per-
formance is more heavily influenced by the person they are 
cooperating with; (f) high Machs tend to be more persuasive 
than low Machs; ( g) in the Prison er 1 s Oil emma game, high Machs 
do not win more, and they may even win ·1 ess if they become 
involved in retaliatory behavior; (h) in the Prisoner's Dilemma 
game, high Machs are sometimes more cooperative than low Machs 
and sometimes less, but they seem to become more competitive 
over time; and (i}__~_!_g~Mach~ At:€. definitely more effective at 
negotiation and coalition games than low Machs. 
The Prisone_r's Dilemma game and interpersonal behavior styles. 
The Prisoner's Dilemma game is a two-person matrix game which has 
been used extensively by psychologists to study cooperative and 
competitive behavior. Nemeth (1972) has retold the anecdote 
which explains the rationale underlying the Prisoner's Dilemma 
game: 
The original anecdote of the Prisoner's Dilemma concerns 
two individuals accused of a crime but who are interviewed 
separately by the police without being able to communicate 
with one another. Each prisoner is faced with two 
alternatives: either to confess to the crime or not to 
confess to it. If both individuals do not confess, both 
will be acquitted. On the other hands if one prisoner 
confesses and the other does not, the individual who 
confesses will not only go free but will also receive 
a reward for turning state's evidence, while his partner 
who did not confess will be given a more severe sentence 
than if he had confessed. However, if both prisoners 
confess, both will be convicted (p. 206). 
In the game, move X, the cooperative move; corresponds td·nat: 
confessing, while move Y, the competitive move, corresponds to 
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confessing. In the classical Prisoner's Delemma game, the 
values in the payoff matrix are arranged so that player who 
plays Y (confesses) while his opponent plays X (does not confess) 
wins the most points while his opponent wins the least points. 
If neither confesses {XX), each receives the second highest 
number of points. If both confess (YY), each receives the 
third highest number of points. The payoff matrix described 
above (XX= 4, 4; XY = 0, 5; YY = l, l) is an example of 
scoring in a classical Prisoner's Dilemma game. 
In the Prisoner's Dilemma game, each player, independently 
of the other, makes one of two moves on each trial, a cooperative 
move (X in the present study, C in conventional notation) or a 
competitive move (Y in the present study, D in conventional 
notation). The number of points that a player wins on any given 
trial depends on the combination of his move and his opponent's 
move (XX, XY, YX, or YY). The points won for the different 
combinations are specified in the payoff matrix. In one game 
condition in the present study, for example, both players won 
4 points for the XX combination, the Y-player won 5 points 
and the X-player 0 points in the XY combination, and both 
players won l point in the YY combination. At the end of the 
game, scores, number of Xs, and number of Ys were summed. 
(As the number of Xs plus the number of Ys was a constant, this 
was redundant.) 
In the present study, subjects in three of the partner 
conditions (B, C, D) were given an option (cf. Anchor & Cross, 
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1974; Berger & Tedeschi, 1969) to make an altruistic move 
("help"), an aggressive move ("zap"), or no move. Using the 
help option, the subject gave his opponent points at a cost to 
himself. Using the zap option, the subject took points away 
at a cost to himself. 
In most studies, the opponent's moves in the Prisoner 1 s 
Dilemma game are programmed so that the subject's responses to 
a predetermined other can be studied. In the present study, 
the partner played randomly 50 percent Xs and 50 percent Vs. 
Partner conditions were varied so Partner B was altruistic 
(made mostly altruistic moves during the option period), 
Partner C was aggressive (played mostly aggressive moves during 
the option period), and Partner D was neutral (made no moves 
during the option period). The game has been varied in countless 
ways. The length of the game has been varied, as have the 
percentage of X and Y moves and the values in the payoff matrix. 
In sum, then, the Prisoner's Di1emma game is an elegantly 
simple device for studying cooperative and competitive behavior 
in an experimental situation which can be modified to include 
the study of aggressive and altruistic behavior. It has been 
criticized as an oversimplification of the bargaining situation 
(cf. Nemeth, 1972), but it continues to be used to study 
cooperative and competitive behavior. 
Altruism and cooperation, aggression and competition have, 
of course been legitimate topics for study in psychology for 
many years; however, the prosocial behaviors, altruism and 
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cooperation, have received increased attention in recent years 
(see Harris & Siebel, 1975; Hoffman, 1975; Rushton, 1976; 
Rushton & Wiener, 1975). Generally, prosocial and asocial 
behavior have been studied separately, but recently MacCrimmon 
and Messick (1976) defined the four terms in relation to each 
other in a way which lends itself to the matrix-game situation. 
Altruism and aggression concern only payoffs or consequences 
for the opponent. Altruistic behavior maximizes payoffs, 
while aggressive behavior minimizes payoffs. Cooperation and 
competition, on the other hand, take into account payoffs to 
both self and other. Cooperation increases the sum of payoffs 
to self and other, while competition increases the difference 
between payoffs to self and other. 
These represent purely behavioral definitions of altruism 
and cooperation, aggression and competition; that is, they do 
not take into account subjective factors, such as intention, 
motivation, or perception, which have been considered important 
aspects of those behaviors by many experts. Thus, Feshbach (1970) 
indicated that aggressive behavior may be defined as behavior 
which harms others or behavior which is intended to harm others. 
McCauley and Berkowitz (1970) and Hoffman (1977) have pointed 
to a similar distinction regarding altruism: some definitions 
concern only consequences, some intentions as well as consequences. 
Generally, these issues have not been raised regarding cooperation 
and competition. Generally, the focus here has been the nature 
of the .interdependence (cf. Deutsch, 1962), whether increasing 
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the payoffs for one increases the payoffs for the other or 
whether it lessens the payoffs for the other. 
With regard to aggression, there is commonly a distinction 
between instrumental aggression, in which the subject has 
nonaggressive goals served by the aggressive behavior, and 
hostile aggression, in which the intention is simply to harm the 
other (cf. Feshbach, 1969). A similar distinction might be 
made regarding altruism. In the present study, with the 
behavioral definition of the various behaviors, it is impossible 
to say why the subject aggressed or helped; in other words, the 
distinction has not been made. 
A number of generalizations have been made regarding 
the effects of partners and payoff matrices which apply here. 
Berkowitz (1974) has reviewed a series of studies done primarily 
by him concerning the effect of others on impulsive aggression: 
this review leads him to conclude, 11 an external object or 
event is capable of evoking impulsive aggressive reactions to 
the extent that it has aggressive meaning; i.e., is associated 
with aggression 11 (p. 153). This observation would lead one to 
expect greater aggressiveness on the part of subjects playing 
against an aggressive other. It has sometimes been found that 
subjects playing against a cooperative partner are more cooperative 
than subjects playing against a competitive partner (Christie et al., 
1970; Wrightsman, Davis, Lucker, Bruininks, Evans, Wilde, 
Paulson, & Clark, 1972). This finding suggests that subjects 
tend to respond in kind towards their partners. (It should be 
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noted that with the Prisoner's Dilemma game this has not 
always been found; cf. Nemeth, 1972.) 
Finally, it should be noted that subjects playing in a 
game with a payoff matrix which rewards cooperation tend to 
cooperate more than those playing in a game which rewards 
competition (Wrightsman et al., 1972). 
Hypotheses 
Machiavellianism, role taking, and empathy. 
1. There is no significant correlation between scores in the 
Role Taking Task and Empathy Questionnaire. 
2. High Machs score significantly higher on the Role Taking 
Task than low Machs. 
3. Low Machs score significantly higher on the Empathy Question-
naire than high Machs. 
4. Subjects scoring high on the Role Taking Task are signifi-
_ cantly more cooperative (score higher on SumX} than those 
scoring low. 
5. Subjects scoring high on the Empathy Questionnaire are 
significantly more cooperative (score higher on SumX) 
than those scoring low. 
6. Subjects scoring high on the Role Taking Task are signifi-
cantly more altruistic (score higher on Altruism) than 
those scoring low. 
7. Subjects scoring high on the Empathy Questionnaire are 
significantly more altruistic (score lower on Altruism) 
than those scoring low. 
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Machiavellianism, partner, and Prisoner 1 s Dilemma game. 
8. High Machs win significantly more points (score higher on 
Total Score) than low Machs. 
9. High Machs play significantly more rationally (score 
higher on Judgment) than low Machs. 
10. High Machs become significantly more competitive (score 
lower on Change in the second half) in the course of 
the game. 
11. High Machs play significantly more aggressively {score 
lower on Altruism) than low Machs. 
12. Subjects playing against an aggressive partner {Partner C) 
are significantly more aggressive (score lower on Altruism) 
than those playing against other partner (Partners Band D). 
28 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects were 80 10- and 11-year-old children, 40 boys 
and 40 girls, recruited from two parochial schools in Chicago. 
Both schools were in middle-class neighborhoods. Initially, 
principals were talked to by telephone, and the first two who 
agreed to large-scale testing of fifth- and sixth-grade 
children were used. Parents were sent consent forms describing 
the project {see Appendix A), and most of the children whose 
parents consented participated in at least the first session. 
Thirty-eight of the 118 children who participated in the first 
session were not included in the final sample. Five were 
eliminated because their verbal IQ scores fell below 95 on the 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Dunn, 1970) or the Cognitive 
Abilities Test (Thorndike, Hogan, & Lorge, 1968), which were 
used as screening instruments. Twenty-five were eliminated 
because they did not return for one or more of the subsequent 
session. Seven were eliminated because they duplicated subjects 
already tested in one of the categories defined by sex, 
Machiavellianism, and type of partner. Finally, one was 
eliminated because he was judged to have insufficient command 
of English to handle the verbal tasks. 
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Subjects were assigned to the different levels of the 
independent variables in the original design in such a manner 
as to insure 5 subjects in each of the 16 cells. The 16 
cells were a product of crossing sex (male, female), Machiavel-
lianism (high Mach, low Mach), and partner (Partner A, Partner B, 
Partner C, and Partner D). In the subsequent analysis, the 
measures of role taking and empathy were included as factors. 
This resulted in a 4 (partner) x 2 (sex) x 2 (Machiavellianism) 
x 2 (role taking) x 2 (empathy) analysis of variance for 
unequal _12. 
Means and standard deviations for age and social class 
as a function of the three primary independent variables are 
presented in Table 1. Social-class standing was computed 
using the Two Factor Index of ~ocial Position (Hollingshead, 
Note 7). The social-class score based on this index is derived 
from the occupation of the head of household and the education 
of head of household. Scores for each vary from 1 to 7, 1 
referring to the highest occupational or educational category, 
7 to the lowest. Occupation is given a weight of 7, education 
a weight of 4. Thus a family in the highest occupational and 
educational category receives a score of 11 ((1 x 7) + (1 x 4) = 
11), while a family in the lowest occupational and educational 
category receives a 77 ((7 x 7) + (7 x 4) = 77). To determine 
whether the differences between the groups for social-class were 
larger than might be expected by chance, a 1 test was done 
on the greatest differences between the means. The only 
significant difference was between high and low Machs. 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Age and Social Class of 
Subjects for Sex, Partner, and Machiavellianism 
Variable n 
Sex 
Male 40 
Female 40 
Partner 
A 20 
B 20 
c 20 
D 20 
Mach 
High 40 
Low 40 
Grand Total 80 
M 
SD 
M 
SD 
M 
SD 
M 
SD 
M 
SD 
M 
SD 
M 
SD 
M 
SD 
M 
SD 
Age 
11.03 
.65 
11.03 
.62 
11.05 
.67 
10.96 
.66 
10.97 
.57 
11. 13 
.66 
10.99 
.68 
11.07 
.58 
11. 03 
.63 
Socia 1 Cl ass 
33.10 
14.32 
31. 82 
17.02 
30. 15 
17. 51 
36.35 
16.38 
34.75 
13. 21 
28.60 
14.99 
28.27 
14.04 
36.65 
16.20 
32.46 
15.64 
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High Machs were significantly higher in social status {mean = 
28.27) than low Machs {mean = 36.65). This was significant, 
l (78) = 2.77, £ L .01. This is consistent with the frequently 
reported negative correlation between a social class and 
Machiavellianism (Christie, 1970c). 
Materials 
Kiddie Mach test. The Kiddie Mach test (Christie, 1970d), 
a 20-item, Likert-type scale, is basically a revision of the 
Mach IV in which items were simplified to make them more 
readily comprehensible to sixth graders. Half the items are 
positively keyed; for example, in item 20, 11 It hurts more to 
lose money than to lose a friend!" agreement indicates a pro-
Machiavellian attitude. Half the items are negatively keyed; 
fir example, in item 2, 11 Most people are good and kind, 11 agree-
ment indicates an anti-Machiavellian attitude. 
In the present study, subjects were required to indicate 
their responses to particular questions (see Appendix A for 
the Kiddie Mach as used in the present study) by circling 
agree a lot, agree a little, no opinion, disagree a lfttle, 
or disagree a Jot. The extreme pro-Machiavellian response 
was given a score of 5, the extreme anti-Machiavellian response 
a score of 1. Thus, scores ranged, theoretically, from a 
low of 20 to a high of 100. The scores actually ranged from 
a low of 31 to a high of 71 with a mean of 50.94. Subjects 
were divided into high and low Machs using a score close to 
the median. In the initial assignment of subjects, boys and girls 
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were assigned separately to conditions of high and low Mach, 
the cut off for boys being 51.5 and the cut off for girls 
50.5. In subsequent analyses, the cut off for the entire 
sample was 51.5, which resulted in a distribution with 38 
high Machs and 42 low Machs. 
Perspective-taking measures. The perspective-taking 
tasks administered in the present study were Feffer's Role 
Taking Task (Feffer, 1959) and the Empathy Questionnaire 
(Feczko, Note 5). In the Role Taking Task, the subject is 
presented with a picture or photograph, usually an action 
picture involving two or more characters, and asked to tell 
a story about the characters in the picture. After he has 
told his initial story, the story having been tape recorded 
or transcribed, the story is repeated to check for accuracy and 
to refresh the subject's memory. The subject is then asked to 
retell the story as if he were one of the characters in 
his own story; i.e., he is asked to take the role of that 
character. The subject is then asked to take the role of each 
of the characters in the story in succession. The subject's 
role-taking score is a function of his ability to shift his 
point of view consistently from one character to another in the 
story he himself has made up. 
Scores are assigned in relation to four categories which 
are ordered according to the number of aspects of the situation 
which are coordinated simultaneously. The four levels are (a) 
simple refocusing--a shift to the point of view of a particular 
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character in the retelling, (b) character elaboration--in 
addition, the subject portrays the other characters consis-
tently with the point of view of the character whose point of 
view he is adopting, (c) perspective elaboration--in addition, 
there must be a clear inner-outer orientation: the subject 
must reveal something about the inner state of the character 
whose role he is taking, while he must see the same character 
exclusively from the outside when he appears in the story 
as told from the point of view of another character, and (d) 
change of perspective--in addition, 11 the subject must have two 
perspective elaborations involving the same two actors" 
{Schnall & Feffer, Note 1, p.30). 
There are three levels of simple refocusing (scores 1-3), 
three levels of character elaboration (scores 4-6), five levels 
of perspective elaboration (scores 7-11), and eight levels of 
change of perspective (scores 14-22). The discontinuity in 
scores between perspective elaboration and change of perspective 
occurs because change of perspective is a combination of two 
perspective elaborations which may vary from 7-11. To arrive 
at an appropriate score, the scorer compares statements about 
the same character as they appear in different versions of the 
same story. Thus, for example, to receive a score within 
11 perspective elaboration," the subject, when taking the point 
of view of a given character, must give information about the 
inner state of that character, but limit himself to information 
about externals when that same character appears in other versions 
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of the same story. Each story is scored separately for 
each character. 
In the present study, the Role Taking Task consisted of 
responses to two different pictures. The first was a picture of 
a teacher with two little girls, one painting and the other having 
just spilled some paint. The second was a picture of several 
boys playing on a slide in a playground. A small boy was 
sliding down towards a bigger boy who had run up from the bottom. 
Several other boys were crowding up the ladder, and one in 
particular was holding out his fist towards the boy climbing up. 
In administering this second picture, the tester specifically 
pointed out the boy shaking his fist, the boy in the middle 
of the slide, and the boy at the bottom of the slide as the 
characters to be focused on in telling a story. A fairly common 
response to the first picture involved a teacher who had come 
over to watch one of her students paint. A second student 
became jealous and spilled the paint to get the teacher's 
attention. A fairly common r.esponse to the second picture 
involved a bully running up the slide while the little boy 
was sliding down. The boys yelled at the bully, telling him to 
let them slide down. 
With few exceptions, each story had three·characters and, 
hence, three scores. Scores from the two stories were summed 
to make the total score, the one used in the present study. In 
the few cases where the subject used two characters, the mean 
was added to the total, yielding a more accurate estimate of the 
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subject's role-taking ability. The present author and another 
graduate student first scored 10 protocols blindly, compared 
their scores to make sure the scoring criteria were clear, 
and then scored 10 more records blindly to establish interrater 
reliability. The results were correlated, yielding an interrater 
reliability of .93. The correlation was computed using the 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient: This author 
then scored the bulk of the protocols. The scores ranged from 
36 to 57 with a mean of 47.57. When role-taking ability was 
considered an independent variable, high role taking and low 
role taking were defined by a cut off point near the median. 
The cut off point was 47.5. This resulted in 43 high role takers 
and 37 low role takers. 
The Empathy Questionnaire, developed by Feczko (Note 5), 
measures the child's ability to identify correctly the feelings 
of others as inferred from their words and actions as well as 
the situation. The measure is based on particularly dramatic 
videotape vignettes taken from the popular television programs 
Kojak, Delvecchio, Serpico, The Brady Bunch, The Andy Griffith 
Show, and The Bob Newhart Show. Vignettes are of approximately 
3 minutes duration, long enough to enable the child to grasp the 
situation but short enough to hold his attention. At specified 
moments during the vignettes, the videotape is stopped, and the 
subjects are asked how one of the main characters is feeling. 
The subject then circles the response which he feels best 
reflects the character's feelings (see Appendix A for the actual 
questions and choices of answers). 
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The programs and vignettes were chosen to inc1ude both 
prosocial and antisocial behavior and to display emotions of 
varying degrees of subtlety. In a11 cases, children were 
asked to identify the emotions of adu1ts. This approach was 
used in order to minimize the like1ihood of this being a measure 
of similarity projection rather than a measure of persona1ity 
stereotyping or individuation (cf. Rothenberg, 1970; Weinstein, 
1969). 
For each of the 20 questions, the four possible answers 
are ordered for scoring purposes according to how accurately 
they reflect the feelings the character is experiencing, the 
best answer receiving a score of 4, the worst a score of l 
(see Appendix A). To assign ratings or scores to the choices, 
eight advanced graduate students in clinical psychology were 
asked to rate the choices. Thus, scores range from a theoretical 
high of 80 to a low of 20. The actual scores ranged from a high 
of 77 to a low of 50 with a mean of 62.32. When empathy was 
considered as an independent variable in the present ·study,, 
those high on empathy were distinguised from those 1ow on 
empathy by a median split, using 62.5 as the median. This 
cutoff divided the distribution into 37 lows and 43 highs. 
Prisoner's Dilemma game. As explained previously, the 
Pri saner' s Dilemma game can be understood as an analog of 
the predicament two suspects find themselves in when both are 
accused of having committed a crime and are interrogated 
1 
separately by police. Each has a choice of confessing (move 
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Y in the present game, the competitive move) or not confessing 
(move X in the present game, the cooperative move). Each knows 
that if neither he nor his partner confesses, they will 
both go free. Each knows that if both confess, both will be 
convicted. Each also knows that if one confesses, while the 
partner does not, the one who confesses will go free and· 
receive a reward for turning state's evidence, while the 
partner will receive a more severe penalty than as if both 
had confessed. Each is simultaneously motivated to confess 
and not to confess. The consequences to each of confessing 
or not confessing are dependen~ upo11 whether the partner confesses 
or does not confess, and neither knows what the other will do. 
(Nemeth, 1972). 
In the classical Prisoner's Dilemma game, points are 
given for each of the four possible combinations of moves 
(confess - not confess or Y - X; not confess - not confess 
or X - X; confess - confess or Y - Y; and not confess -
confess or X - Y) so that the Y-player in the first wins 
most; the X-players in the next win less; the Y-players in the 
next win still less; and the X-player in the last wins the 
least. Game 2, in the present study, is an example of a classic 
Prisoner's Dilemma game: 
Your move Partner's move Your points Partner's points 
y x 5 0 
x x 4 4 
y y 1 1 
x y 0 5 
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Playing against a partner who plays randomly 50% Xs and 50% 
Vs, it is to the subject's advantage to play Vs .. 
Game 1 is a modification of the Prisoner 1 s Dilemma game in 
which it is to the subject's advantage to play Xs against a 
partner who plays randomly 50% Xs and 50% Ys: 
Your move Partner 1 s move Your points Partner 1 s points 
y x 3 0 
x x 6 6 
y y 1 1 
x y 0 3 
Game 1 is not a classical Prisoner's Dilemma game because the 
highest payoff is for the X - X-players, not for the V-player 
in the Y - X combination. The player who plays Xs consistently 
in Game 1 wins on the average 3 points a game, while the player 
who plays Vs consistently wins 2 points a game on the average. 
The consequences of playing Xs and Ys are reversed in Game 2. 
The more logical players would be expected to adapt their 
play to these differences. 
Procedure 
Subject recruitment was begun by te 1 ephone calls to 
principals of local parochial grammar schools. The researcher, 
after identifying himself as a graduate student in psychology, 
explained the nature of the study and its requirements in 
terms of time. It was stressed that participation would be 
entirely voluntary on the part of the children and their parents, 
that the project had been approved by the university ethics 
committee and the researcher 1 s dissertation committee. 
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Three of the first six or seven principals contacted agreed, 
and two of those were selected. 
Parental consent forms were sent home (see Appendix A) 
and children whose parents consented were given the initial 
set of tests. Testing was done in the school itself, during 
school hours at one school and affer school at the other. 
The first session included the Kiddie Mach test and other 
tests used in a study by another graduate student (see 
Feczko, Note 5), whose research overlapped the present work. 
The instructions to the Kiddie Mach were read aloud (see 
Appendix A), and the tester answered questions. The tester 
then read each of the 20 questions aloud and paused at the 
end of each to allow the children to circle their answers. 
In cases where children asked about the individual items, the 
tester explained them as simply as possible. When the testing 
was over, the tester collected the papers and thanked the children. 
The Role Taking Task and the Empathy Questionnaire were 
administered in a second session. Although there was some 
variation in the testing format, most of the children were 
tested in groups of eight, four taking the Empathy Question-
naire with Ms. Feczko and four taking the Role Taking Task with 
this researcher and three assistants (a graduate student and 
two undergraduate students) who had been selected, trained, and 
supervised by Feczko and this researcher. 
In the present study, each subject had 40 moves, two sets 
of 10 in Game 1 and two sets of 10 in Game 2. The sequence of 
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games was either 1, 2, 1, 2, or 2, l, 2, 1. To counterbalance 
for order-of-presentation effects, half the subjects began with 
Game 1 and half with Game 2. (See Appendix A for the actual 
form the subjects received.) _In_ the Prisoner's Oil emma game, 
which is most often played against a mechanical device programmed 
to play a set sequence of Xs and Vs, the subject believes he 
is playing against an actual partner who is moving (playing Xs 
and Vs) simultaneously with him and who is receiving his moves 
just as he believes he is receiving his partner's moves. As 
previously mentioned partner, in the present study, a confederate 
of the investigator, played randomly 50% Xs and 50% Vs. Against 
such a partner, a consistent X-player would win an average 
of 3 points a move in Game l and 2 points a move in Game 2, 
while a consistent V-player would win an average of 2 points a 
move in Game l and 3 points a move in Game 2. The rational 
player who understands the differences between Matrix 1 and 
Matrix 2 and the partner's style of play will play mostly Xs 
in Game l and mostly Vs in Game 2. (This perhaps oversimplified 
approach does not take into account the subject's attempts to 
influence his partner's game behavior.) This describes the 
11 X-V Game, 11 as the children ca 11 ed it, as it was played by 
children in the Partner-A (no option) condition. 
Berger and Tedischi (1969) have described a 11 zap 11 option 
in the Prisoner 1 s Oil emma Game. Every seven moves, the subject has 
the option of 11 zapping 11 his partner; i.e., taking points away from 
the partner at a cost to himself. The present study also included 
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a 11 help 11 option, in which the subject could give his partner 
points at a cost to himself. Every five moves in the Partner-B, 
Partner-C, and Partner-D conditions, the subject had the option 
of zapping his partner (taking 10 points away at a cost of two 
points), helping him (giving him 10 points at a cost of two 
points), or doing nothing. In the 40 moves, then, there were 
eight options. In the Partner-B condition, the partner helped 
six times and did nothing twice. In the Partner-C condition, 
the partner zapped six times and did nothing twice. In the 
Partner-D condition, the partner did nothing all eight.times. 
The three option conditions were more complex than the no-
option condition (Partner A); the subject had a larger arsenal of 
behavior at his disposal, and he had more information about his 
partner. Partner B was fundamentaliy altruistic, Partner C 
hostile or aggressive, and Partner D neutral. 
Six scores were derived from the Prisoner's Dilemma game; 
Total Score, Judgment, SumX, Altruism, Change, and Difference. 
Total Score, Judgment, SumX, and Change had to do with patterns 
of Xs and Ys and applied to subjects i~ all partner conditions. 
Altruism and Difference had to do with the subject's tendency to 
use the help or zap option and applied only to subjects in 
Partner conditions B, C, and D. 
Total Score was the sum total of points a subject won in 
a game, excluding the effects of the options: it referred to the 
total points each subject won as a result of the combination of 
Xs and Ys. It was a measure of general effectiveness in the game. 
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Judgment was the sum of Xs played in Game l minus the sum 
of Xs played in Game 2. Since it was advantageous to play Xs 
in Game l and Ys in Game 2, due to differences in the payoff 
matrices, Judgment reflected the subject's understanding of the 
matrices and his ability to adapt to the differences. (This, 
of course, assumed that the subject focused on the payoff matrices 
per se. It is theoretically possible that the subject might 
have understood the differences in the payoff matrices but 
because of his particular strategy did not respond to the 
difference.) 
Sum X was the sum of the Xs the subject played and was con-
sidered a measure of cooperativeness. Since there were 40 
moves in all and the alternative to X was Y, Sum X was directly 
related to the proportion of X moves. 
Altruism was the sum of option scores and so applied only 
to subjects in Partners B, C, and D conditions. A positive 
score indicated a tendency towards a1truism, a negative score 
a tendency towards aggression. Corresponding to the points 
the subject gave or took away from the opponent during the 
option move, a zap counted -1, a help +l, and no move counted 
0. The structure of the game and the Altruism score rest on 
the assumption that altruism and aggression are mutually exclusive 
and represent polar opposites. These are by no means self-
evi dent. 
Change was the number of Xs in the second two games minus 
the number of Xs in the first two games. A positive score 
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indicated increased cooperativeness in the course of the game. 
Difference was the change score for the option and was 
arrived at by subtracting the option points of the first two 
games from the option points of the second two games. A positive 
score indicated a change to a more positive or less negative play. 
To take the Role Taking Task, the child was seated 
opposite the tester facing him. The picture was placed next 
to the tester where he could point to the characters in question, 
and where the child would have a clear view of the picture. 
The tester began by saying, 11 ! want to see what a good story-
teller you are. Can you tell a story about the people in this 
picture?" (The tester pointed to the teacher, the two little 
girls in one picture, the boy at the bottom of the slide, 
the boy in the middle, and the boy gesturing at the top of 
the slide.) 11 Tell \'/hat's going on, what happened before, 
and how it all turns out. You can tell what the people are 
thinking and feeling. 11 The tester wrote down the story as 
the child told it. If the story was extremely meager, two or 
three short sentences, the subject was encouraged to tell how 
it all turned out or how the people were thinking and feeling. 
When the subject had finished his initial story, the tester 
read it back to make sure it was correct and to refresh the 
subject's memory. 
After any corrections were made and the child indicated 
that the tester had the story right, the tester said, 11 Now, 
tell the same story again. Only this time make believe you 
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are 
--------
II (The tester pointed to one of the 
characters, naming him.) "Tell your story like you are ____ 11 
Again, the tester transcribed the story as it was told, slowing 
the subject down when necessary by repeating the words of the story. 
(In fact, most of the children watched the examiner write down 
the story and paced their story accordingly.) After retelling the 
story three times, once from the point of view of each of the 
three characters, the subject went to another tester and repeated 
the whole process for the second picture. After telling stories 
to both pictures, the subject was thanked and went to take the 
Empathy Questionnaire, returned to the classroom, or went home. 
Later, the stories were transcribed onto standard forms 
for scoring (see Appendix A). 
Though this too varied, the Empathy Questionnaire was 
most often given to children in groups of four. The children were 
seated in front of the television monitor, and the tester said: 
We are interested in finding out what children see when 
watching TV programs. I have some programs of people 
doing different things. Please watch closely. I will 
be asking you some questions as we watch. I'll want 
you to circle on·your papers how certain people are 
feeling. I'll read the choices out loud to you. This 
is not a test. There are no right or wrong answers. 
I only want to know what YQ.!! think the reople in TV 
are feeling, and what YQ.!! think may be different from 
what the boy or girl sitting next to you thinks the 
character is feeling. Some of these will be harder to 
figure out than others. Do you understand? 
The tester answered any questions, and the testing began. 
The videotape was turned on, and as each crucial moment in the 
tape approached, the tester said, "Mow watch 11 naming 
----
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the character about whom the question was going to be asked. 
The videotape was stopped when the crucial moment was reached, 
and the tester read the question and the four choices. After 
pausing to let the children circle the answers of their choice, 
the tester went on. When the testing was over, the tester 
thanked the children, and they went to take the Role Taking 
Task, back to the classroom, or home. 
For the Prisoner's Dilemma game, chairs were arranged in 
a circle facing outward from the center. Balloons, candy, and 
gum were laid out on a table in plain view with signs under-
neath indicating how many points each item was worth. Most 
children were tested in groups of six to eight. The children 
were seated and told to read the instructions while the tester 
finished his preparations. The tester and his assistants 
were each assigned two or three subjects. Their job was to 
explain the game or answer questions during the practice and to 
write down the partner's moves on their children's forms. 
They were also to pretend to write down their subjects' moves 
and flash them by means of secret hand signals to one of 
the other "messengers" who would write down the subject's moves. 
When everything was arranged, the testers took their 
places behind their subjects, on the inside of the circle, and 
one of the testers read the instructions from the form (see 
Appendix A), adding after the end of the second paragraph, 
11 You know what cooperative means. iJhen you cooperate with 
someone, you work together to help each other get as much as 
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possible. And you know what competitive means. When you compete, 
like in sports, you try to win more than your partner. You try 
to beat him. 11 And at the beginning of the fourth paragraph, the 
tester said, 11 , and , and I (naming the testers) 
~~--,-- -~~~
will be messengers. We will write down your moves and then 
flash them to your partner's messenger who will give them to 
your partner. We will get your partner's move from his mes-
senger and write them down on your paper." This was apparently 
credible, for when testing was over and the subjects were 
debriefed, none of them indicated they suspected that they 
had not been playing with an actual partner. 
The group then went through the practice trials, with the 
tester explaining the moves and the options as well as the 
scoring to those children who seemed to have trouble under-
standing them. 
When all the testers were satisfied that their subjects 
understood, the testing began. When it was over, each subject 
added up his points and chose a combination of gum, candy and 
balloons, the 11 cost 11 of which equalled his total points. 
Balloons were 10 points, miniature Hershey bars 30 points, 
gum 40 points, and bags of M & Ms 50 points. Most subjects 
won in the neighborhood of 100 points. Subjects whose partners 
had been hostile or neutral were given extra points, called 
a bonus, and this was justif]ed on the grounds that they had had 
a mean partner. 
After all the testing was completed, the researcher 
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returned to the school to explain to the children and interested 
parents more about the study and to answer questions. At 
that time he explained that the Prisoner's Dilemma game had been 
"rigged" to the extent that the partner's moves had been plan-
ned and there had been no actual partner. It was explained 
that this was done in order to find out how children play against 
different types of partners. None of the children appeared 
to be upset. After answering the children's questions, he 
invited them and their parents to call him should there be 
fu~ther questions. He also promised to send to the school a 
brief summary of the results when the data were analyzed. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results in the present study were analyzed both to 
test hypotheses and to explore for relationships not specifical-
ly posited in the hypotheses. Hypotheses l through 3 concerned 
the relationships among Machiavellianism, role taking and 
empathy, as measured by the Kiddie Mach test, the Role Taking 
Task, and the Empathy Questionnaire, respectively. For purposes 
of the initial analysis, which explored the differences in the 
Prisoner's Dilemma game variables as a function of partner, 
Machiavellianism, and sex, separate divisions close to the 
median were used to distinguish high and low Mach boys (51.5) and 
girls (50.5). As the difference between the sexes was slight, 
in the subsequent analyses, where the individual cells had 
unequal frequencies, a single cutoff of 51.5 was used. When 
differences in other variables were explored as function of 
role taking and empathy, cutoffs of 47.5 and 62.5 were used, 
respectively, to distinguish subjects high and low on the 
Role Taking Task and Empathy Questionnaire. 
Hypotheses 4 through 7 concerned the relationships between 
role taking and empathy and the dependent variables of the 
Prisoner's Dilemma game. Those dependent variables were Total 
Score (total points won), Judgment (moves appropriate to the 
matrices minus those not appropriate), SumX (cooperative moves 
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minus competitive moves), Altruism (sum of scores on option 
moves), Change (cooperative moves in the first vs. the second 
half of the game), and Difference (Altruism score in the 
first v~ the second half of the game). 
Hypotheses 8 through 12 concerned the relationships 
between Machiavellianism, partner, and the dependent variables 
of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. The variable partner represent-
ed the different moves which the confederate made during the 
option. In Partner A, there was no option condition at all. 
In Partner B, the confederate made the 11 help 11 move six times 
and no move twice (the subject was therefore playing against 
an altruistic partner). In Partner C, the confederate made 
the 11 zap 11 move six times and no move twice (the subject was 
therefore playing against a hostile partner). In Partner 0, 
the confederate made no moves (the subject was playing against 
a neutral partner). 
Machiavellianism, Role Taking, and Empathy 
Null Hypothesis l, that there was no significant cor-
relation between role taking and empathy, was tested by cor-
relating the Role Taking Task and Empathy Questionnaire 
scores (see Table 2), using the Pearson product-moment cor-
relation coefficient. This resulted in a low positive cor-
relation, r. (78) = .22, p_L .05. Thus, Null Hypothesis l 
was formally rejected; however, this low correlation accounts 
for less than 5 percent of the variance, and the Role Taking 
50 
Table 2 
Correlations among Measures of Interpersonal Competence and 
Variables of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
Role Total Judg- Altru- Di ff er-
Taking Empathy Score ment SumX ism Change ence 
Machiavel-
lianism .08 -.26** .04 .07 .00 - . 13 -.06 - . 12 
Role 
Taking -.22* .25* . 16 ·-. 14 - • 18 .02 -.02 
Empathy . 13 -.06 - . 15 -.04 . l 0 -.07 
Total 
Score .67**-.15 -.31* -.06 -.04 
Judgment .00 -.29* -.02 .09 
SumX . 16 . 17 -.11 
Altruism .19 -.05 
Change 
-.22 
Note: Since n for Altruism and Difference-was 60, excludino 
Partner A, and the n for the other variables was 80, the critical 
values required to establish statistical significance were 
different for different correlations. 
*£ L .05 (two-tailed) 
**Q L .01 (two-tailed) 
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Task and Empathy Questionnaire can be interpreted, for practical 
purposes, as unrelated. This result and interpretation is 
compatible with the findings of Kurdek and Rodgon (1975) and 
Moir (1974) which showed measures of role taking and ~mpat~y to 
be uncorrelated more often than they were correlated in dif-
ferent samples and with different measures of the constructs. 
To test Hypothesis 2, that high Machs score higher on 
the Role Taking Task than low Machs, high and low Machs were 
compared with regard to their performance on the Role Taking 
Task. The differences, as shown in Table 4, were not statistical-
ly significant,£. (1, 76) = .25. The finding of a nonsignifi-
cant correlation is compatible with this result as indicated 
by Table 2. (See Table 3 for the relevant means.) 
The reasoning underlying Hypothesis 2 was not based on 
experimental findings. As high Machs are cognitively oriented 
(Geis & Christie, 1970) and are said to be more competent 
socially (Weinstein, 1969), they might be expected to be 
superior to low Machs at role taking, which is the ability to 
urderstand what the other knows. The failure to find confirmation 
for Hypothesis 2 might be accounted for bn two grounds: First, 
high Machs do not excel in cognitive ability (high and low 
Machs do not differ in intelligence, for example) but rather 
in their ability to stay focused on the task at hand in the 
presence of distractions, which low Machs tend to involve 
themselves in emotionally (Geis et al. 1970). Second, performance 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Role Taking Task in 
Relation to Different Levels of Machiavellianism and Empathy 
Machiavellianism 
Empathy High Low Total 
n 16 27 43 
High M 48.25 48.63 48.89 
SD 5.37 4.32 4.68 
n 22 15 37 
Low M 47 .14 45.60 46.51 
SD 4.66 3.81 4.35 
n 38 42 80 
Total M 47.61 47.55 47.57 
SD 4.93 4.31 4.61 
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Table 4 
Analysis of Variance for the Role Taking Task in Relation to 
Different Levels of Machiavellianism and Empathy 
Source df MS F 
Machiavellianism (M) l 
1 
l 
5. 16 
82.65 
17.35 
20.78 
L 1.00 
Empathy (E) 
M X E 
Error 
*p_ L . 05 
3.98* 
1.61 
76 
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on the Role Taking Task involves an understanding of the other's 
feelings as one aspect of achieving a high score; it is not 
exclusively a measure of understanding another's cognitions. 
To test Hypothesis 3, that low Machs score higher on 
Empathy than high Machs, high and low Machs were compared with 
regard to their performance on the Empathy Questionnaire. 
The hypothesis was supported: Low Machs scored higher on the 
Empathy Questionnaire (!1 = 63.60) than high Machs (!1 = 60.92). 
(See Table 5). As table 6 indicates, this difference was 
statistically significant, f_ (1, 76) = 6.37, P...L .05. The 
low, but significant correlation between Machiavellianism and 
empathy (Table 2) was consistent with this, r (78) = -.26, 
£ L .os. 
The evidence that low Machs were better at understanding 
the emotions of others might be understood in relation to findings 
that low Machs have a more elaborate system of concepts for 
understanding others than high Machs (Delia & O'Keefe, 1976). 
Subjects with a more differentiated conceptual structure for 
dealing with a given subject area might be expected to dis-
criminate more effectively within that area. Further, low Machs, 
who are move likely to become involved with people and are 
oriented to emotions (Geis & Christie, 1970), have a more highly 
developed awareness of emotional experiences of others. 
In sum, the low correlation between role taking and 
empathy in the present study is consistent with the view that 
they may be considered distinct abilities. The results of the 
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Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Empathy -Ouestionnaire 
in Relation to Different Levels of Machiavellianism and Role 
Taking 
Machiavellianism 
Role Taking High Low Total 
n 21 22 43 
High M 61.38 64.27 62.86 
SD 4.15 4.33 4.44 
n 17 20 37 
Low M 60.35 62.85 61.70 
SD 5.58 5. 18 5.44 
n 38 42 80 
Total M 60.92 63.60 62.32 
so 4.80 4.75 4.93 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Variance for Empathy Questionnaire in Relation 
to Different Levels of Machiavellianism and Role Taking 
Source df 
Machiavellianism (M) l 
Role Taking (RT) 1 
M x RT 1 
Error 76 
*£. L .o5 
MS 
146.37 
30.36 
• 77 
23.00 
F 
6.37* 
l. 32 
Li .oo 
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present study support the notion that low Machs have a better 
understanding of the emotions of others than high Machs; however, 
they seem not to differ in their ability to understand the cog-
nitions of others. High Machs have generally been seen as more 
effective operators or manipulators. The inference was drawn 
that they were more competent interpersonally (Weinstein, 1969). 
The results of the present study are compatible with the view of 
Geis and Christie (1970) that high and low Machs have different 
interpersonal abilities, not that one is superior. 
Role Taking, Empathy, and the Prisoner 1 s Dilemma Game 
Hypotheses 4 through 7 investigated differences in the 
variables of the Prisoner 1 s Dilemma game in relation to levels 
of role taking and empathy. These hypotheses dealt with 
questions which concerned role taking and empathy as predictors 
of performance in the highly structured, highly simplified 
interpersonal situation of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. The 
analysis used to evaluate the statistical significance of 
results be~ring on these hypotheses was a 4 (partner) x 2 (sex) 
x 2 (Machiavellianism) x 2 (role taking) x 2 (empathy) analysis 
of variance for unequal fl_. 
Hypothesis 4, that subjects scoring high on the Role 
Taking Task are more cooperative (score higher on SumX) than those 
scoring low, was evaluated by comparing the performances of high __ 
and low role takers on SumX (see Table 7). As reported in 
Table 8, the difference between high role takers and low role 
takers did not reach statistical significance,£.. (1, 28) = 1.18. 
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations of Total Score, Judgment, and 
SumX on the Prisoner's Delemma Game in Relation to Partner, 
Role Taking, and Empathy 
Variable n Total Score Judgment SumX 
Partner A 
Role Taking Hi 11 M 103.09 2.91 13.27 
SD 4.59 2.55 5.83 
Lo 9 -M 98.33 .44 19. 11 
SD 5.87 3.50 4.54 
Partner B 
Role Taking Hi 8 M 100.75 1. 50 18. 50 
SD 6.16 3.85 5.01 
Lo 12 M 96. 75 .42 17.42 
SD 7.39 2.57 4.89 
Partner C 
Role Taking Hi 11 M 101 . 18 2.18 13.64 
SD 6.76 4.56 6.47 
Lo 9 M 98.56 2.22 11.33 
SD 4.25 2.91 4.90 
Partner D 
Role Taking Hi 13 M 106.23 5.46 15.92 
SD 4.60 3.78 5.85 
Lo 7 M 100.57 1.86 15.86 
SD 4.89 3.53 5.27 
Role Taking 
Hi 43 M l 03. 12 3.23 15. 14 
SD 5. 77 3.93 6.00 
Lo 37 M 98.30 1.14 16.05 
SD 5.84 3.07 5. 51 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Partner A 
Empathy Hi 12 M 102.08 2.08 14.58 
SD 5.90 3.65 6. 71 
Lo 8 M 99.25 1. 38 17.88 
SD 5.04 2.50 4.26 
Partner B 
Empathy Hi 11 M 98.18 1.00 16.45 
SD 5. 13 2.49 4.87 
Lo 9 M 98.56 .67 19. 56 SD 9.21 3.87 4.46 
Partner C 
Empathy Hi 10 M 102. 10 3.00 10.40 
SD 6.71 4.24 5.56 
Lo 10 M 97.90 1.40 14. 80 
SD 3.98 3.34 5.39 
Partner D 
Empathy Hi 10 M 104.60 2.90 16.70 
SD 4.01 4.01 6.22 
Lo 10 M 103.90 5.50 15. 10 
SD 6.64 3.75 4.91 
Empathy 
Hi 43 M 101.67 2.21 14.58 
SD 5.81 3.60 6.21 
Lo 37 M 99.97 2.32 16.70 SD 6.70 3.84 5.03 
Table 8 
Analysis of Variance for Unequal H_: Total Score, Judgment, and 
SumX for Prisoner's Di~lemma in Relation to Role Taking, Empathy, 
and Interactions 
Source 
Role Taking (R) 
Empathy (E) 
Partner (P) x R 
P X E 
Sex (S) X R 
S X E 
Machiavellianism 
(M) X R 
M X E 
R X E 
P X S X R 
P X S X E 
P X M X R 
P X M X E 
P X R X E 
S X M X R 
S X M X E 
S X R X E 
M X R X E 
P X S X M X R 
P X S X M X E 
P X S X R X E 
Error 
*Q L .o5 
**QL .01 
Total Score Judgment SumX 
df MS F MS F MS F 
l 316.99 12.70** 62.27 4.58* 1. 18 I 1.00 
l 21. 72 I 1.00 1.76 L l.oo 102.34 3.65 
10.47 7 1.00 3 14.48 1.07 45.04 l.60 
3 21.94/1.00 22.17 1.63 54.68 l.95 
l .01 z 1.00 . 01 I 1. oo 28.61 1.02 
l 104.07 4. 17 1.93 L i.oo 25.23 L i.oo 
l 1.19 I l.Oo 4.26 
l 23.19 7 1.00 1.22 
l 2.09 7 1.00 13.16 
3 28.87 - 1.16 4.45 
3 11.44 I l.oo 4.64 
3 25.58 - 1.03 7.12 
3 10.84 I l.Oo 10.21 
3 114.66 - 4.59** 25.59 
l 29.99 1.20 .75 
l 26.75 1.07 .69 
l 72.50 2.90 .05 
l 49.94 2.00 8.56 
2 152.20 6.01** 14.85 
l 66.01 2.64 19.20 
l 23.57 L i.oo .02 
28 24.96 28.08 
. 31 3. 78 L i. oo 
.09 23.23 I 1.00 
.97 145.75 5.26* 
.33 6.95 I l.oo 
.34 5.93/1.00 
.52 87.69 - 3.12* 
.75 13.97 I l.oo 
1. 88 19. 04 7 1. 00 
. 06 . 38 7 1. 00 
.05 9. 75 7 1.00 
.01 13.28 7 1.00 
.63 12.54 7 l.00 
1.09 7.0171.00 
1.41 9.08 7 l.00 
.01 145.55 - 5.18* 
13.60 
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Hypothesis 5, that subjects scoring high on the Empathy 
Questionnaire are more cooperative (score higher on SumX) than 
those scoring low, was evaluated by comparing the performances 
of those high and low on the Empathy Questionnaire on SumX (see 
Table 7). As with the Role Taking Task, the difference did 
not reach statistical significance,£. (1, 28) = 3.65 (see Table 8). 
In other words, the results suggest that high scores on 
the Role Taking Task and the Empathy Questionnaire are not associ-
ated with cooperativeness, as measured by the Prisoner's 
Dilemma game. 
The present findings are not incompatible with those of 
Ceresnie (1974), Ianotti (1974), and Rushton and Weiner (1974) 
which showed no significant relationship between role taking and 
cooperative behavior. 
This area is further complicated in the present study by a 
statistically significant interaction between level of the 
Role Taking Task, level of Empathy Questionnaire, and SumX, 
£. (1, 28) = 5.26, £ L .05 (see Table 8). As shown in Table 7, 
the greatest difference was between high scorers on the Empathy 
Questionnaire (M = 13:31) and low scorers (~ = 17.94) among 
subjects scoring high on role taking. Those scoring low on the 
Role Taking Task were intermediate; the mean for those high on the 
Empathy Questionnaire was 16.53, the mean for those low on the 
Empathy Questionnaire 15.65. In sum, the relationship between 
measures of social competence and cooperation is unclear. Some 
investigations have found a positive relationship; some have 
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found no relationship. The result~ of the present study are 
consistent with studies which have found no main effect of role 
taking or empathy on cooperativeness; however, there may be a 
significant statistical interaction between role taking, empathy, 
and cooperation. It is impossible to decide at this point 
whether the differences in results are a product of sampling 
error, differences in the measures, or complex relationship 
between social competence and cooperativeness. 
Hypothesis 6, that subjects scoring high on the Role Taking 
Task are more altruistic (score higher on Altruism) than those 
scoring low, was tested by comparing the Altruism scores of 
subjects scoring high on the Role Taking Task with those of 
subjects scoring low. This difference was not statistically 
significant, f (l, 20) = 1.78, (see Tables 9 and 10). 
Hypothesis 7, that subjects scoring high on the Empathy 
Questionnaire are more altruistic (score higher on Altruism) 
than those scoring low was tested in an analogous fashion. 
As indicated in Table 10, this difference was also not sig-
nificant, f. (1, 20) = 1.65. 
A single finding in the literature (Feshbach & Feshbach, 
1969) has reported a positive correlation between aggressiveness and 
empathy. However, the bulk of the evidence is consistent with 
a positive correlation between role tak·ing, empathy, and altruism. 
The results of the present study, if they can be said to 
support any' relationship between the Role Taking Task, the 
Empathy Questionnaire, and prosocial behavior measured by the 
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Table 9 
Means and Standard Deviations of Altruism for Role Taking, 
Empathy, and Partner 
Variable Altruism 
n M SD 
-
Partner B 
Role Taking Hi 8 -3.13 4.45 
Lo 12 - . 33 4. 16 
Partner C 
Role Taking Hi 11 -5.73 2.45 
Lo 9 -4.67 4.39 
Partner D 
Role Taking Hi 13 -4.23 3.56 
Lo 7 -3.43 2.37 
Role Taking 
Hi 32 --4.47 3.52 
Lo 28 -2.50 4.23 
Partner B 
Empathy Hi 11 -1.64 4.37 
Lo 9 -1.22 4.68 
Partner C 
Empathy Hi 10 -6.30 1. 20 
Lo 10 -4.20 4.37 
.Partner D 
Empathy Hi 10 -4.60 2.84 
Lo 10 -3.30 3.47 
Empathy 
Hi 31 -4. 10 3.68 
29 -2.97 4.22 
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Table 10 
Analysis of Variance for Unequal Ji: Altruism as a Function of 
Role Taking, Empathy, and Interactions 
Source df MS F 
Role Taking ( R) l 31. 51 l. 78 
Empathy (E) l 29.30 1.65 
Partner (P) 2 4.61 L 1.00 
P X E 2 4. 72 Li .oo 
Sex (S) Role Taking l 6.41 L l .oo 
S X E l 26.17 1.48 
Machiave1lianism (M) X R l 0.00 I 1.00 
M X E l 2.67 L 1.00 
R X E l 6.55 L l .oo 
P X S X R 2 24.02 1.36 
P X S X E 2 16.53 L 1.00 
P X M X R 2 4.00 L i .oo 
P X M X E 2 i.68 L 1.00 
P X R X E 2 21.66 l. 22 , 
S X M X R l .24 L 1.00 
S X M X E l l.16 L l .oo 
S X R X E l .01 L l .oo 
M X R X E l 1. 16 L 1.00 
P X S X M X R 2 7.05 Li .oo 
P X S X M X E l 20.42 l. 15 
Error 20 17. 73 
Prisoner's Dilemma game, suggest that subjects scoring higher on 
measures of social competence tend to be slightly less altruistic 
and more aggressive than those scoring low on measures of 
social competence. 
One finding of possible importance which was not hypothe-
sized was that subjects high on role taking score significantly 
higher on Total Score and Judgment (.tl = 103.12 and 3.23, 
respectively) than subjects low on role taking (11 = 98.30 and 
1.14, respectively) (see Table 7). The difference between 
means of Total Score was highly significant, I (l, 28) = 
12.70, £ L .01, while the difference between the means of 
Judgment was barely significant, [ (1, 28) ~ 4.58, £L .05, 
(see Table 8). The same differences did not appear in relation 
to empathy. An inference might be made that, at least in the 
context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, subjects high on 
role taking are more effective and grasp the logical structures 
of the game better than subjects low on role taking. 
Machiavellianism, Partner, and the Prisoner's Dilemma game 
Hypotheses concerning Machiavellianism and partner were 
considered together because one hypothesis involved both 
variables. The analysis used to evaluate the statistical 
significance of results bearing on Hypotheses 8, 9, 10, and 12 
was a 4 (partner) x 2 (sex) x 2 (Machiavellianism) analysis 
of variance for equal .!:!_. The analysis used to evaluate the 
statistical significance of results bearing on Hypotheses 10 
was a 4 (partner) x 2 (sex) x 2 (Machiavellianism) analysis of 
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variance for repeated measures. 
Hypothesis 8, that high Machs win more points (score 
higher on Total Score) than low Machs, was tested by comparing 
scores of high and low Machs on Total Score. This difference 
was not statistically significant, £ (1, 64) = .19, as shown 
in Table 12. (See Table 11 for_the means.) 
Hypothesis 9, that high Machs play more rationally (score 
higher on Judgment) was tested by comparing high and low Machs 
on Judgment. As with Total Score, this result was not statis-
tically significant, f (l, 28) = .05 (see Table 12). 
The results clearly support previous findings (Geis & 
Christie, 1970) that high Machs are not more effective than 
low Machs in situations which are not face-to-face and do not 
permit manipulation. One of the reasons for including the 
option was to encourage low Machs to become distracted or involved 
in the game in ways which the traditional Prisoner's Dilemma 
game did not. Under these circumstance, it was reasoned, 
low Mach subjects would not focus on differences in the payoff 
matrix and consequently high Machs would win, since they tend to 
remain objective. Evidently, the modifications of the Prisoner's 
Dilemma game used in the present study did not alter it sig-
nificantly from that point of view. 
Hypothesis 10, high Machs become more competitive (score low-
er on Change in the second half) in the course of the game, was 
tested by examing the Change scores of high Machs (see Table 13). 
This difference was not statistically significant, f (l, 16) = .38 
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Table 11 
Means and Standard Deviations for Total Score, Judgment~ and 
SumX in Relation to Partner and Mach 
Variable n Total Score Judgment SumX 
-
Partner A 
Mach Hi 12 M 102.75 3.25 15.50 
SD 5.01 3.45 7.07 
Lo 8 M 99.75 .83 16. 17 
SD 5.88 2. 72 5.41 
Total 20 M 100.95 1.80 15.90 
SD 5.61 3. 19 5.96 
Partner B 
Mach .Hi 10 M 98.30 .80 18.60 
SD 7.57 3.49 5.58 
Lo 10 M 98.40 .90 17 .10 
SD 6.88 2.85 4. 12 
Total 20 M 98.35 .:85 . 17 .85 
SD 7.04 3. 10 4.84 
Partner C 
Mach Hi 10 M 99.00 1.80 11. 80 
SD 6. 31 2.74 6.96 
Lo 10 M 101.00 2.60 13.40 
SD 5.35 4. 77 4.58 
Total 20 M 100.00 2.20 12.60 
SD 5.79 3.81 5.79 
Partner D 
Mach Hi 10 M 103. 10 3.80 16.00 
SD 5.55 3.49 6. 31 
Lo 10 M 105.40 4.60 15.80 
SD 5. 17 4.,62 4.94 
Total 20 M 104.25 4.20 15.90 
SD 5.35 4.01 5. 51 
Mach 
Hi 40 M 100.68 2.37 15.47 
SD 6.38 3.39 6.70 
Lo 40 M 101.07 2. 17 15.64 
SD 6.22 3.98 4.83 
Table 12 
Analysis of Variance for Equal N: Total Score, Judgment, and 
SumX in relation to Partner, Sex and Machiavellianism 
Partner (P) 
Sex (S) 
Mach (M) 
p x s 
P X M 
S X M 
P X S X M 
Error 
*£ L .o5 
**£.L .01 
Total Score Judgement Su;nX 
df MS F MS F MS F 
3 123.58 3.46* 139.78 3.00* 94.91 3.07* 
l 
l 
3 
3 
l 
3 
64 
49.61 1,38 
6. 61 L i. oo 
64. 05 1. 79 
20. 65 L i.oo 
2.81 L l.oo 
40. 71 1.14 
35. 72 
25.31 1.90 
.61 L i.oo 
9.11 L i. oo 
. 61 L l. oo 
10.85 L i.oo 19.98 L i.oo 
3. 61 L i. oo a. 9 s L 1. oo 
.61 L l.oo 21.01 L i.oo 
12.08 L l.oo 80.49 2.60 
13. 28 30.84 
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Table 13 
Means and Standard Deviations for Variables of Change and 
Difference for the Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
Change Difference 
First Second First Second 
Half Half Half Half 
Partner A 
Mach Hi M 7.88 7.63 
SD 3.23 4.17 
Lo M 8.67 7.50 
SD 3. 14 3.29 
Total M 8.35 7.55 
SD 3.12 3.56 
Partner B 
Mach Hi M 9.60 9.00 -1.30 -0.70 
SD 2. 12 4.55 2.67 2. 16 
Lo M 8.40 8.70 -0.80 0.00 
SD 2.41 2.87 2.78 2.05 
Total M 9.00 8.85 -1.05 - . 35 
SD 2.29 3.70 -2.67 2.08 
Partner C 
Mach Hi M 6.50 5.30 -3.20 -2.80 
SD 3.47 3.95 1.14 1.87 
Lo M 7 .10 6.30 -2.50 -2.90 
SD 2.'88 2.98 1. 18 · l. 29 
Total M 6.80 5.80 -2.85 -2.85 
SD 3. 12 3.44 1.18 l. 57 
Partner D 
Mach Hi M 9.20 6.80 -2.40 -2.50 
SD 3.39 3.05 1.58 l. 35 
Lo M 8.80 7.00 -1.70 -1.90 
SD 3.22 2.62 1. 77 l.37 
Total M 9.00 6.90 -2.05 -2.20 
SD 3.23 2. 77 1. 67 1.36 
Mach 
Hi M 8.32 7. 16 -2.30 -2.00 
SD 3.22 4.04 2.00 2.00 
Lo M 8.26 7.38 -1.67 -1.60 
SD 2.91 2.99 2.07 1.98 
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(see Table 14). This does not support the finding of Christie 
et al. (1970) that in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, high Machs 
become significantly more competitive over time. This may be due 
to the fact that, in the present study, the game was run for 
relatively few trials. 
Hypothesis 11, high Machs play more aggressively (score 
lower on Altruism) than low Machs, was tested by comparing the 
Altruism scores of high and low Machs. This difference did not 
reach statistical significance,£. {l, 48) = 1.92, as indicated 
in Table 16. The study of Hahlin reviewed in Christie et al. 
(1970), thus, was not supported. 
Hypothesis 12, that subjects playing against an aggressive 
partner (Partner C) are more aggressive (score lower on Altruism) 
than those playing against other partners (Partners B and D), 
was tested by examining the effects of Partner on Altruism. 
Subjects playing against Partner C did score lower (!:! = -5.25) 
than those playing against Partner B (t!_ = -1.45) or Partner D 
(M = -3.95) (see Table 15). The main effect of Partner was 
highly significant,£. (2, 40) = 5.45, £ [ . . 01 {see Table 16). 
The individual means were compared using the Newman-Keuls 
procedure and those values were evaluated against Duncan's 
critical values. The difference between the Partner C condition 
and the Partner B condition (the altruistic partner) was 
statistically significant. The difference between Partner C 
and Partner D (the neutral partner) was not (see Table 17). 
These results lend partial support to Berkowitz' (1974) finding 
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Table 14 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance for Change and Difference 
Change Difference 
df MS F df MS F 
Partner 3 2.53 L l .oo 2 l.17 Li .oo 
Sex 1 .35 L l .oo l 1.80 1.38 
Mach 1 1. 96 L l .oo 1 .06 L 1.00 
Partner X Sex 3 9.39 1.83 2 .27 L i .oo 
Partner X Mach 3 4 .13 L 1.00 2 1.03 L l .oo 
Sex X Mach 1 6. 72 l. 31 l 1. 70 1. 30 
Error 16 5. 13 12 1. 30 
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Table 15 
Means and Standard Deviations for Altruism in Relation to 
Partner, Sex and Machiavellianism 
Independent Variable n 
-
M SD 
Grand Total 60 -3.55 3.96 
Partner B 20 -1.45 4.39 
c 20 -5.25 3.40 
D 20 -3.95 3. 15 
Male 30 -4.33 3.62 
Female 30 -2. 77 4.18 
Mach Hi 30 -4.20 3.92 
Lo 30 -2.90 3.96 
Table 16 
Analysis of Variance for Equal N: Altruism in Relation to 
Partner, Sex, and MachiavellianTsm 
df MS F 
Partner (P) 2 74.60 5.45** 
Sex (S) l 36.82 2.69 
Mach (M) 1 25.35 1. 92 
p x s 2 22.87 1.67 
P X M 2 .60 L 1.00 
S X M 1 8.82 L l .oo 
P X S X M 2 .87 L l .oo 
Error 48 13. 67 
*.e_ L .o5 
**.e_ L .01 
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Table 17 
Individual Comparisons among Means for Different Levels of 
Partner Using the Newman-Keuls Procedure Evaluated Against 
Duncan's Critical Values 
Dependent 
Variable Comparison R df 
.9. 
Total Score B - D 4 64 4.42** 
c - D 3 64 3.18* 
B - A 3 64 l. 95 
Judgment D - B 4 64 4.12** 
A - D 4 64 2.95 
SumX B - C 4 64 4.23** 
D - c 3 64 2.66 
Altruism B - C 3 48 4.60** 
B - D 2 48 3.02* 
D - C 2 48 2.06 
*£. L .os 
**£. L .01 
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that aggressiveness in others leads to aggressiveness. 
The difference between the Partner B and Partner D 
conditions was also significant, as indicated in Table 17. 
This suggests an extension of Berkowitz' notions: subjects 
tend to respond in kind to other people regarding altruistic 
and aggressive behavior. 
Partner was the most consistently significant variable in 
the present study. In addition to Altruism, Total Score, 
Judgment, and SumX were significantly affected by Partner. 
(see Tables 11 and 12). Specificaily, for Total Score, ..E. 
(3, 64) = 3.46, Q L .05, for Judgment, £.. (3, 64) = 3.00, 
p_[ .05, and for SumX, £.. (3, 64) = 3.07, p_[ .05. As indicated 
by the Neuman Keuls test, reported in Table 17, Total Score 
subjects in the Partner D condition scored significantly higher 
(M = 104.25) than those in the Partner B condition (M = 98.35), 
and they scored significantly higher than those in the Partner C 
condition (M = 100.00), but Partner A(~= 100.95) did not 
differ significantly from Partner B. For Judgment, Partner D 
(M = 4.20) was significantly higher than Partner B (M = .85), 
but not significantly higher than Partner A (M = 1.80). The 
points accumulated or lost as a result of the option moves 
was not considered in Total Score, Judgment, or SumX. One 
interpretation of these findings is that playing against either 
a benevolent or antagonistic partner tends to distract the subject 
from performing with maximum effectiveness on the task at hand 
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while playing against a neutral partner in a game with an 
option enhances effectiveness. It may be that having a benevo-
lent partner is a further deterrent to effective play perhaps 
because the subject is not moved to play actively. 
Not surprisingly, subjects playing against an altruistic 
partner were most cooperative (~ = 17.85) and those playing 
against hostile partner (~ = 12.60) were least cooperative. 
This difference was significant, as indicated in Table 17. 
The absence of a significant correlation between cooperativeness 
and altruism, as indicated in Table 2, suggests that those behaviors 
are not related empirically and that 11 prosocial 11 is not an 
appropriate category to subsume them under. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that sex was not significant 
as an independent variable with regard to any of the other 
variables and that no significant differences were found in Change 
and Difference. 
The results of the present study ::an be sumnarized as 
follows: the treatment variable partner was the most consistently 
significant of the independent variables, having a significant 
effect on a 11 but the change va ri ab 1 es in the Pri saner':.; Oil emma 
game. With regard to affecting prosocial and asocial responses, 
the partner's behavior style elicited similar responses in the 
subjects. With regard to effectiveness~ the neutral partner 
elicited with the most effective performance and the benign 
partner elicited the least effective performance. Machiavel-
lianism was related to empathy but not role taking. 
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High Machs scored lower on the Empathy Questionnaire than low 
Machs. The Role Taking Task and Empathy Questionnaire showed 
a low positive correlation. Role Taking was the only one of the 
subject variables which was significantly related, as a main 
effect, to any of the Prisoner's Dilemma game variables. 
Subjects high on the Role Taking Task were more effective 
players, as indicated by Total Score. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
To predict a subject 1 s performan~e in the present study, 
it was more important to know hml/ his partner played than to 
know his scores on measures of social competence. Indeed, 
the only inference which could be drawn legitimately from 
a subject 1 s scores on measures of social competence was that if 
he scored high on the Role Taking Task, he was likely to win 
more points and understand the payoff matrix better than if he 
scored low. In contrast, if a subject played a neutral partner, 
he was likely to win more points and understand the payoff 
matrix better than if he played an altruistic or an aggressive 
partner; and if a subject played an altruistic partner, he was 
likely to play more altruistically and more cooperatively 
than if he played an aggressive partner. It is, of course, 
an empirical question whether these results generalize to other 
samples, populations, measures of interpersonal competence, 
and interpersonal situations. 
The Kiddie Mach test, the Role Taking Task, and the Empathy 
Questionnaire, which measured the subconstructs of interpersonal 
competence in the present study, showed low correlations. The 
Kiddie Mach test and the Empathy Questionnaire had a low negative 
correlation; the Role Taking Task and the Empathy Questionnaire 
had a low positive correlation; and the Role Taking Task and 
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the Kiddie Mach test had a nonsignificant correlation. These 
findings are consonant with results of previous studies: if 
the construct "social competence 11 , or 11 social intell igence 11 , 
is valid, then the tests purporting to measure that construct 
do not measure it accurately. The patterns of correlations 
among those tests and tests of related constructs, such as 
11 abstract intelligence 11 , shm-J neither appropriate convergent 
nor discriminant validity for the construct. 
A major limitation of the present study was that inter-
personal behavior was studied in a minimal interpersonal 
situation, the Prisoner's Dilemma game in which there were either 
two or five possible responses to the same responses of an unknown 
and unseen partner. Further, prosocial and asocial behavior 
were operationalized so they were mutually exclusive. In the 
present study, hostile aggression was not distinguished from 
instrumental aggression; nor was the analogous distinction 
made with regard to altruism, cooperation, and competition. 
In other words, further studies might profitably use measures 
of interpersonal behavior and interpersonal situations which 
bear a closer resemblance to actual social situations than 
did the measures in the present study. 
One possible explanation for the finding that measures 
of social competence have little to do with interpersonal 
behavior is that these measures actually have little predictive 
value relative to actual behavior. Another is that the measures 
used in the present study are not appropriate. Empathy is 
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not required in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, and there is 
little room for an interpersonal manipulator to operate. 
Perhaps the Role Taking Task is related to performance on 
the Prisoner's Dilemma game because it involves maintaining 
logical consistency among a number of story elements, and the 
game also involves an understanding of the relationships 
among a limited number of elements. Perhaps intelligence 
and level of motivation would be predictive of performance 
in this game because the subject had to understnad the game 
and attend despite its repetitiveness. A third explanation 
might be that a division approximating a median split was 
used to distinguish subjects high and low on measures of 
social competence while the different partners' response 
patterns were quite distinct. Perhaps three or four levels 
on each variable would reveal differences between the extremes 
which related to the Prisoner's Dilemma game. 
In conclusion, the overlapping concepts and complicated 
measures in the area of social competence have produced more 
confusion than clarity. It is to be hoped that further studies 
will be designed to gather information on a variety of measures 
of social competence so that multitrait-multimethod validation 
procedures may be used to tease out meaningful constructs in that 
area. 
Thorndike, in his definition of social intelligence (1920), 
included both an understanding of an appropriate behavior in 
social relationships. Walker and Foley (1973) have emphasized 
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that an understanding of social relationships, as measured by 
tests of social cognition or social intelligence, has not been 
shown empirically to be related to appropriate social behavior. 
The present study, which has included a measure of Machiavel-
1 ianism among measures of social competence, tend to underline 
the suspicion that the two may not be closely related. 
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SUMMARY 
A Machiavellian orientation to interpersonal relations 
and perspective-taking ability are frequently mentioned as 
prerequisites for effective social interaction. The present 
study investigated the relationship between those personality 
variables, partner's response, and the interpersonal behaviors 
of altruism, aggression, cooperation, and competition. In the 
present study, Machiavellianism was measured by the Kiddie Mach 
test and perspective-taking ability by the Role Taking Task and 
the Empathy Questionnaire. The interpersonal behaviors were 
measured by a modified Prisoner's Dilemma game. The game was 
modified by (a) introducing an option in some conditions 
which permitted the subject to make an aggressive or an altruistic 
move, and (b) changing the payoff matrix in half the games so 
that it was to the subject 1 s advantage to play cooperatively, 
given that his partner played cooperatively 50 percent of the time. 
Scores reflected the total points won, understanding of the 
game matrix, cooperativeness (vs. competitiveness), altruism 
(vs. aggression), and change in altruism or cooperativeness. 
Some subjects played against an altruistic partner, some against 
an aggressive partner, and some against a neutral partner. 
Subjects were 80 10- and 11-year-old boys and girls. 
It was hypothesized that (a) the Role Taking Task and the 
Empathy Questionnaire are not significantly correlated, (b) 
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high Machs score significantly higher on the Role Taking Task 
than low Machs, and (c) low Machs score significantly higher 
on the Empathy Questionnaire than high Machs. The Role Taking 
Task and the Empathy Questionnaire showed a significant positive 
correlation; high Machs did not score significantly higher on 
the Role Taking Task than low Machs, however, low Machs scored 
significantly higher on the Empathy Questionnaire than high 
Machs. Further, it was hypothesized that (d) subjects scoring 
high on the Role Taking Task or the Empathy Questionnaire 
are significantly more cooperative than those scoring low, 
and (e) subjects scoring high on the Role Taking Task or the 
Empathy Questionnaire are significantly more altruistic than 
those scoring low. Neither hypothesis was supported. Finally, 
it was hypothesized that (f) high Machs win significantly 
more points and play significantly more rationally than low 
Machs, (g) high Machs become significantly more competitive 
in the course of the game, (h) high Machs play significantly 
more aggressively than low Machs, and (i) subject playing 
against an aggressive partner play more aggressively than 
those playing against other partners. Only the last hypothesis 
received even partial support: subjects playing against an 
aggressive partner were significantly more aggressive than 
those playing against an altruistic partner, but they were not 
significantly more aggressive than playing aqainst a neutral 
partner. 
There were two significant findings which had not been 
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hypothesized: {a) subjects scoring high on the Role Taking 
Task won significantly more points and showed significantly a 
better understanding of the payoff matrix than those scoring low, 
and (b) subjects won significantly more points when playing 
against a neutral partner than when playing against either 
an altruistic or an aggressive partner. 
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APPENDIX A 
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I. PARENTAL CONSENT FORM 
The following letter was somewhat modified because this 
researcher's study overlapped that of a fellow graduate student 
and a form was devised to include both studies. Also, specific 
times and dates were included, depending on the school. 
Dear Parents: 
I am a Ph.D. candidate in psychology at Loyola University 
of Chicago. My dissertation research concerns the relation-
ship between children's interpersonal orientations and their 
behavior in a game situation. It would be most helpful if you 
would allow your son/daughter 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
to participate in the study. 
First, your child will fill out a short questionnaire 
concerning his interpersonal orientation. He will then perform 
tasks measuring his role-taking and empathetic skills. Finally, 
he will play the game. In the game, he will have two possible 
moves, and the number of points he wins will aepend both on the 
moves he makes and the move his partner makes. At certain points 
in the game, he may have the option of giving his partner points 
or taking them away from his. His partner will have the same 
option. At the end of the game, children will be able to buy 
candy and gum with their points. 
I expect your child to enjoy the tasks, but if at any time 
he decides not to continue, he will be free to do so. You 
yourself are welcome to ask questions and see the testing 
materials before, during, or after the testing. Please call me 
at home at 274-4192. Evenings are best. After the testing is 
completed, I will come to the school to explain the tests and 
the study to the children and interested parents. 
Besides being enjoyable, I believe this study will provide 
a useful experience for your child in contrast to so many testing 
experiences. In this one he will be able to relax, enjoy the 
tasks, and talk to the tester when testing is over. 
The results of the tests are entirely confidential. Your 
child will be assigned a number, and the results of his tests 
will be analyzed statistically, along with those of the other 
children. 
If your child is to participate, I will need a little 
background information. Please give the occupation of the 
head of the household (job title and job description) and years 
of education of the head of the household. 
Respectfully, 
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Please sign and return the following to school. 
I give my permission for my child to 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
participate in Mr. Bryant's study. 
Occupation of head of household ~~~~·~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Years of education of head of household 
~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
II. Empathy Questionnaire. 
The Brady Bunc~: Mr. & Mrs. Brady switch jobs for a day. 
1) How does Mrs. Br~ feel after her second fall? 
a) upset b) sore c) discouraged d) frustrated 
2) How does Mr. Brady feel after he has fallen? 
a) sorry b) embarassed c) funny d) hassled 
3) How does Marcia feel when she says "Smarty"? 
a) sad b) angry c) insulted d) "stuck-up" 
The Andy Griffith Show: Helen Krump, Andy's girlfriend is 
the director of a school play. 
4) How does Andy feel when Helen says, "Who else would 
pitch in without being asked?" 
a) tricked b) angry c) surprised d) helpful 
5) How does Andy feel after Goober's imitation of Cary Grant? 
a) tired b) angry c) uninterested d) bored 
6) How does Helen feel when she says, "We did want it to 
be a surprise"? 
a) worried b) shocked c) pleased d) "on the 
spot" 
Serpico: Serpico, an undercover policeman, pretends to be 
an M-16 rifle salesman selling guns to black 
gangsters. 
7) How is the black man feeling when he tells Serpico to 
"put his whole life into his story"? 
a) angry b) worried c) manacing d) hateful 
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8) How does Serpico feel when he is told that he got off 
at the wrong stop on the subway? 
a) scared b) upset c) overpowered d) sad 
9) How does Serpico feel when the black boss tells his 
men to "Let him go"? 
a) happy b) satisfied c) brave d) relieved 
10) How does the black boss feel at the end as his assistant 
smiles? 
a) clever b) good c) pleased d) worried 
The Bob Newhart Show: Bob and Emily are visited by Bob 1 s 
mother. 
11) How is Emily feeling when she says, "Could you help? 11 
a) unhappy b) tired c) aggravated d) disgusted 
12) How is Emily feeling when she asks, "Does the place 
look all right?" 
a) nervous b) scared c) calm d) worried 
13) How does Bob feel when he says, "My mother and father 
are separated."? 
a) shocked b) insulted c) confused d) unhappy 
Kojak: Joseph Arrow, a young Indian living in New York 
has a hot temper. 
14) How does the old man feel when he says to Joseph, 11 Who 
the hell are you?" 
a) angry b) scared c) curious d) shocked 
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15) How is ~oseph feeling when he says, "It was really 
ridiculous."? 
a) desperate b) insulted c) unhappy d) angry 
16) How is Joseph feeling when he says, "I just came for my 
job back."? 
a) stupid b) scared c) sorry d) misunderstood 
17) What is Ben feeling when he says t_o Joseph, "Say it, 
Say it!"? 
a) impatient b) upset c) furious d) important 
18) What is Joseph feeling when Ben tells him to, "Go sell 
your feathers."? 
a) unhappy b) insulted c) misunderstood d) rage 
Delvecchio: Police officers, Delvecchio (tall and thin) and 
Chauncy (short and chubby) are on a case. Billy 
is their suspect. 
19) How is Billy feeling when Delvecchio says, "Police 
Officers, Billy."? 
a) scared b) trapped c) excited d) upset 
20) How is Chauncy feeling when he says to Billy, "What's 
the matter with you?" 
a) angry b) worried c) "at the end of his rope" 
d) impatient 
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III. Scoring Guide, Empathy Questionnaire 
Question Answer SGore 
l ) sore 1 
upset 2 
frustrated 3 
discouraged 4 
2) funny l 
sorry 2 
embarassed 3 
hassled 4 
3) stuck-up 1 
sad 2 
angry 3 
insulted 4 
4) helpful 1 
angry 2 
surprised 3 
tricked 4 
5) angry 1 
tired 2 
uninterested 3 
bored 4 
6) pleased l 
worried 2 
shocked 3 
11 on the spot 11 4 
7) worried 1 
angry 2 
hateful 3 
menacing 4 
8) sad 1 
upset 2 
overpowered 3 
scared 4 
9) brave 1 
happy 2 
satisfied 3 
relieved 4 
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Question Answer Score 
--
10) worried 1 
good 2 
pleased 3 
clever 4 
11) tired. 1 
unhappy 2 
disgusted 3 
aggravated 4 
12) calm l 
scared 2 
worried 3 
nervous 4 
13) insulted 1 
unhappy 2 
shocked 3 
confused 4 
14) curious l 
angry 2 
scared 3 
shocked 4 
15) unhappy 1 
angry 2 
insulted 3 
des pa rate 4 
16) stupid 1 
scared 2 
sorry 3 
misunderstood 4 
17) important l 
upset 2 
impatient 3 
furious 4 
18) misunderstood l 
unhappy 2 
insulted 3 
rage 4 
19) excited 1 
upset 2 
scared 3 
trapped 4 
Q1:1estion 
20) 
Answer 
worried 
impatient 
angry 
11 at the end of his rope 11 
Score 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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IV. Kiddie Mach Test. 
Name: 
Age: 
Birthday: 
lBelow are twenty statements. They are matters of opinion, and I 
am interested in your opinion on each statement. You may agree 
or disagree. You may agree or disagree a little or a lot) I 
will read each statement aloud whild you read it to yourself. ~l··I ·~· : 
!To tell me your opinion, circle one of the five..E.!).t:C!~~? after vr·J' ·· ,-~· 
the statementjl-agree a lot, agree a little, no opinion, disagree 
a little, disagree a lot. Any questions? 
Because(! have to have ),Our honest opinion_~ I won't tell anyone 
how you filled it in. c~ou will agree with some statements and 
disagree with others. Just give your first reaction. You will 
have some opinion about practically every statement.) 
l. Never tell anyone why you did something unless it will 
help you. 
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
2. Most people are good and kind. ' 
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
3. The best way to get a 1 ong with people is to te 11 them 
things that will make them happy. 
agree a lot .£.gree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
\ ' ~ . 
t l 
4. You should do something only when you are sure it is right. 
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
5. It is smartest to believe that all people will be mean if 
;, I ' they have a chance. 
agree a lot agree a little ~inion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
6. You should always be honest, no matter what. 
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
7. Sometimes you have to hurt other people to get what J' ~ 
you want. 
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
8. Most people won 1 t work hard unless you make them do it. 
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
9. It is better to be ordinary and honest than famous and L ', 
dishonest. 
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
10. It 1 s better to tell someone why you want hime to help you ,, 
than to make up a good story to get him to do it. · ' 
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
11. Successful people are mostly honest and good. 
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble. 
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
13. A criminal is just like other people except that he is 
stupid enough to get caught. 
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
14. Most people are brave. 
_agree a lot agree a little .!!Q.___Q_Qinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
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15. It is smart to be nice to important people even if you 
don't really 1 i ke them. 
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
16. It is possible to be good in every way. ~ 
agree a lot agree a little no o~inion disagree a 1 ittl e 
disagree a lot 
17. Most people can not be easily fooled. JI \ 
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
I' 
··l 
18. Sometimes you have to cheat a little to get what you want.) 
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
19. It is never right to tell a lie. 
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little 
disagree a lot 
20. It hurts more to lose money than to lose a friend. '' .
agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a 1 ittl e 
disagree a lot 
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V. The X-Y Game (Prisoner 1 s Delemma Game). 
The form without the option (Partner-A condition) was 
essentially the same, except that instructions for the option, 
as well as spaces for the option moves, were omitted. 
THE POINTS GAME--PRACTICE 
The idea of the points game is for you to win as many points 
as possible. At the end of the game you will be able to buy 
things with your points. No matter what happens, you will win 
points. 
You have two moves in this game, X and Y. Your partner also 
has two moves, X and Y. How many points you win depends on 
how you play and how your partner plays. X is the cooperative 
move. Y is the competitive move. 
Every five p 1 ays, I will say 11 option. 11 When I say 11 option, 11 
you can do one of three things. 1) you can help your partner 
(give him 10 points, but it will cost you 2 points}. 2) You 
can zap your partner (take 10 points away from your partner, 
but it will cost you 2 points). 3) Do nothing. Remember, 
your partner will have the same option. 
You will not know who your partner is. All you will know about 
him is how he makes his moves. All he will know about you is how 
you make your moves. You will be getting to know him by the way 
he makes his moves. He will be getting to know you in the same 
way. We will not tell you who your partner is. 
Game 1--points 
Your move Partner's move 
X (cooperative) X (cooperative) 
X (cooperative) Y (competitive) 
Y (competitive) X (cooperative) 
Y (competitive) X (competitive) 
Option--it costs you two points to 
10) or to zap him (take 10 away). 
to do nothing. 
Your points Partner's points 
6 6 
0 3 
3 0 
l l 
help your partner (give him 
It doesn't cost you anything 
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You make your move by writing X or Y in the space under "your move." 
Someone will record your move and write it on your partner's sheet. 
They will also record your partner's move and write it on your 
sheet. 
Your move 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Option 
Game 2--points 
Your move 
x 
x 
y 
y 
Partner's move 
Partner's move 
x 
y 
x 
y 
Option (same as above) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Option 
Your points 
Your points 
4 
0 
5 
l 
Partner's points 
Partner's points 
4 
5 
0 
1 
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Name 
---
Game 1--points 
Your move Partner's move Your points Partner's points 
x x 6 6 
x y 0 3 
y x 3 0 
y y l l 
Option: Help (H) gives your partner 10, costs you 2. 
Your move 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
----
Option 
6. 
----
7. 
----
8. 
----
9. 
----
10. 
----
Option 
Zap (Z) takes away 10 from your partner, costs you 2. 
Nothing 
Partner's move Your points Partner's points 
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Game 2--points 
Your move 
x 
x 
y 
y 
Option: 
Your move 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Option 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
----
Option 
Partner's move Your points Partner's points 
x 4 4 
y 0 5 
x 5 0 
y l l 
Help (H) gives your partner 10, costs you 2. 
Zap (Z) takes away 10 from your partner. 
Nothing 
Partner's move Your points Partner's points 
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Game 1--points 
Your move Partner's move Your points Partner's points 
x x 6 6 
x y 0 3 
y x 3 0 
y y 1 l 
Option: Help {H) gives your partner 10, costs you 2. 
Zap {Z) takes away 10 from your partner, costs you 2. 
Your move 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Option 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
----
----
Option 
Nothing 
Partner's move Your points Partner's points 
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Game 2--points 
Your move 
x 
x 
y 
y 
Option: 
Your move 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
----
----
Option 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
~---
Option 
Name 
Partner's move Your points Partner's points 
x 
y 
x 
y 
4 
0 
5 
l 
Help (H) gives your partner 10, costs you 
Zap (Z) takes away 10 from your partner. 
Nothing 
2. 
4 
5 
0 
l 
Partner's move Your points Partner's points 
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